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ABSTRACT 
 
  The paper demonstrates that the Argentine political arena or “party system” is, 
has been, and continues to be structured as a two-dimensional space, and more precisely, 
at least from 1945 to 2002, as a double political spectrum. This structure for party or 
leaders’ competition has resisted and outlasted many regime changes, economic 
calamities, and institutionally short-lived political actors. In fact, positions in the two-
dimensional Argentine political space are far more stable than the partisan institutions 
themselves; a position abandoned within it leads to the creation of a new partisan actor to 
fill it. The dimension orthogonal to the left-right axis, itself very present in Argentina, is 
clearly rooted in the social, political, political-cultural, and sociocultural cleavage 
between Peronism and the forces opposed to it, or “anti-Peronism.” Both Peronism and 
anti-Peronism, moreover, fully range from left to right, thus creating a double political 
spectrum in Argentina. This main cleavage, in addition, has been notoriously difficult to 
characterize ideologically and politically, also complicating the comparative analysis of 
party systems. A key goal of this paper is to show that it is best understood—in a more 
general way—as being a conflict and contrast between the “high” and the “low” (Ostiguy 
2009) in politics. 
  This paper combines spatial analysis (including political mapping) with the 
qualitative historical analysis it often lacks. The paper examines both political appeals 
and their electoral reception—thus taking into account observable political discourse and 
differentiated practices as well as more conventional political sociology of voting. The 
paper moreover provides an original account, based on appeals and rapidly shifting “axes 
of differentiation” in politics, of the creation of what then congealed as the cleavage 
between Peronism and anti-Peronism. Overall, the paper constitutes a thorough analysis 
of party systems, political identities, and electoral strategies from 1944 up to 2007 in 
Argentina within a resilient, structured political space. It is also, as such, an analysis of 
Peronism and its opposite. 
 
RESUMEN 
 
  Este artículo demuestra que la arena política o el “sistema de partidos” argentino 
es, fue y continúa siendo estructurado como un espacio bi-dimensional y más 
precisamente, por lo menos desde 1945 hasta el 2002, como un doble espectro político. 
Esta estructura para la competencia partidaria o entre líderes ha resistido y sobrevivido a 
varios cambios de régimen, calamidades económicas y actores políticos sin duración 
institucional. En realidad, las posiciones en el espacio político bi-dimensional argentino 
son mucho más estables que las mismas instituciones partidarias; una posición 
abandonada dentro de él lleva a la creación de un nuevo actor partidario para llenarla.  La 
dimensión perpendicular al eje izquierda-derecha, a su vez muy presente en la Argentina, 
está claramente arraigada en el clivaje social, político, político-cultural y sociocultural 
entre el Peronismo y las fuerzas opuestas a éste, o “anti-Peronismo.” Tanto el Peronismo 
como el anti-Peronismo, además, se extienden plenamente desde la izquierda hasta la 
derecha, creando asi un doble espectro político en la Argentina. Ese clivaje principal, por  
 
lo demás, ha sido notoriamente difícil de caracterizar ideológica y políticamente, 
complicando también el análisis comparado de los sistemas de partidos. Un propósito 
clave de este artículo es mostrar que esa división se debe entender—de modo más 
general—como un conflicto y contraste entre lo “alto” y lo “bajo” (Ostiguy 2009) en 
política. 
  El artículo combina de modo original el análisis espacial (incluso como 
cartografía política) y el análisis histórico cualitativo que muchas veces le hace falta. El 
artículo examina tanto las interpelaciones políticas como su recepción electoral, tomando 
en cuenta por lo tanto el discurso político y las prácticas diferenciadas así como la más 
convencional sociología del voto. El artículo provee además una explicación original, 
basada en interpelaciones y “ejes de diferenciación” que fueron cambiando rápidamente, 
del surgimiento de lo que se solidificó como el clivaje entre Peronismo y anti-Peronismo. 
Con todo, el artículo constituye un análisis completo de los sistemas de partidos, 
identidades políticas y estrategias electorales en la Argentina, desde 1944 hasta el 2007, 
dentro de un espacio político estructurado y perdurable. También es, en sí, un análisis del 
Peronismo y de su opuesto, el anti-Peronismo. 
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During the entire second half of the twentieth century, a notable feature of Argentine 
politics has been the stability of the main political cleavage that structures its party 
system. This endurance is especially remarkable given the country’s otherwise extremely 
unstable history: in the last half-century, Argentina has had four military coups, two 
bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes, two different populist experiments, two episodes of 
restricted liberal democracy with a major political party banned, and full liberal 
democracy. Nor was Argentina’s political instability and unpredictability limited to its 
changing regime types: there was severe left-right polarization in the 1970s, but also left-
right political coalitions in the 1940s, as well as in 1999–2001 under the Alianza 
(Alliance). The economy, often said to have a major impact on politics, was equally 
fitful: Argentina’s economy imploded in late 2001 to 2002, the country went through an 
episode of hyper-inflation in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the currency was changed 
four times in two decades, and the country suffered a drastic recession in 1981–82. 
Despite all of this instability and lack of pattern—and, some would say, as a partial cause 
of it—the main political cleavage that defines the Argentine party system and more 
precisely, Argentina’s structured political space, has remained the same, that is, the one 
between Peronism and the political forces opposing Peronism-in-power, i.e., anti-
Peronism. 
  Yet in spite its resilience, this cleavage has been notoriously difficult to 
characterize politically, not to say ideologically. We know that, socially, this cleavage is 
to a large extent class based.
1 Empirically, educational level is a statistically remarkable 
predictor of voters’ preferences across this cleavage.
2 But these social characteristics of 
the cleavage do not indicate what the cleavage is politically, in contrast to socially. The 
electoral coalition that brought Perón to power in 1946, for example, included the newly 
formed left-of-center Labor Party as well as right-wing nationalists. The forces opposing 
Perón, calling themselves the Democratic Union, ranged from Communists and 
Socialists, to Radicales (Radicals), to conservative business sectors. 
  Politically, Peronism has been regarded by well-established scholars, such as 
Torcuato Di Tella, as an eternally proto social-democratic or Labor party, because it is 
massively and clearly supported by the unions and the working class, and because, with 
varying intensity, it has historically favored redistributionist socioeconomic policies.
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With perhaps equal justification, Peronism has been regarded by other renowned scholars 
of a somewhat older generation, who lived during Peronism’s initial decade in power, as 
a local variation on, and failed attempt at, a fascist movement (e.g., Halperín 1995 
[1956]: 53–54; J. L. Romero 1963 [1946]: 238, 244–254).
4 Peronism’s mobilizational, 
leader-oriented, nationalist, and somewhat authoritarian character,
5 its modern use of the 
state for propagandistic purposes, and Perón’s initial pro-Axis and then long-lasting 
Franco sympathies are all emphasized in this view. Certainly, Perón did choose Franco’s 
Spain for his exile (after a stay with Trujillo) and never hid his admiration for Il Duce. In 
his seminal work Political Man, Seymour Martin Lipset attempted to reconcile these two 
apparently contradictory perspectives, hailing “the phenomenon known as Peronism” as 
the “fascism of the lower class” (1981: 173–76).
6 This ingenious resolution, however, 
obscures more than it helps. 
  As if this were not sufficient, in ideological terms Peronism has been sequentially 
characterized as fascism, laborism, corporatism, revolutionary socialism (in the 1970s), 
national-populism, social-Christian (Perón),
7 social democracy (Di Tella),
8 neoliberalism 
(in the 1990s), according to Halperín and other commentators,
9 popular conservatism, 
and under the early government of Nestor Kirchner, progressive! 
  We can, however, find order in what appears politically rather confusing and 
shifting. First, although left and right are highly relevant in Argentine politics and within 
Argentina’s party system or political space, the main political cleavage in Argentina is 
most definitely not defined in left-right terms. Indeed, both Peronism and the various 
anti-Peronist forces have fully ranged across the left-right spectrum. In other words, to a 
large extent the Peronism/anti-Peronism political cleavage has historically crosscut the 
left-right axis. On the anti-Peronist side in Argentina, there is and has been an important 
socialist left, dominant among intellectuals, centrist Radicales, and, historically, a pro-US 
and pro-market economics right. The same full-blown left-right scale historically existed 
within Peronism. Left-right polarization within Peronism reached extremes in the 1970s, 
tearing the country apart, when the Peronist left, the Peronist unions center, and the 
Peronist far-right all engaged in armed activities against one another. In the late 1960s, 
even Perón, while in exile and hosted by Franco, praised Che Guevara
10 and is said to 
have referred to Mao as “this little Chinese man who steals my ideas.”
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dark humor, he repeatedly praised a national form of socialism, against capitalist 
exploitation and US or Soviet imperialism. 
  In this paper I show that Argentina’s politics and its party system (or more 
broadly, its political space) are structured as a double political spectrum (Figure 1). In 
other words, there are two parallel spectra, each ranging from left to right, structuring the 
Argentine political space. This raises the important question of the nature of the 
dimension orthogonal to the left-right scale, as we need concepts more generic and 
substantive than “Peronism” and “anti-Peronism” and similarly want crisp political 
categories that travel. In a recent Kellogg Working Paper (Ostiguy 2009), I conceptually 
introduced and comparatively discussed the key concepts of high and low in politics. 
That paper provides indispensable groundwork for the present paper on Argentina. High 
and low together constitute a dimension, and a scale, in politics. The high-low axis is, at 
the same time, fully neutral with regard to the left-right spectrum or axis—a quality that 
is relatively rare. These two orthogonal political dimensions, i.e., the classical left-right 
axis and the high-low dimension, together make up a very useful two-dimensional 
political space, which is structured in Argentina as a double political spectrum. The 
structure of Argentina’s political space has proven surprisingly enduring, outlasting the 
institutional life of many actors—whether political parties or political leaders—which 
have appeared and disappeared in Argentina’s politics.
12 This mapping and spatial 
political framework also accounts for the fact that left-right differences within parties in 
Argentina are often greater than those between parties, and it explains why different 
parties or party factions that are actually quite similar in their left-right positions often 
differ so substantially both in their choice of political alliances and in their social bases. 
This two-dimensional space of appeals in politics is thus particularly useful for 
understanding political positioning and the social reception of various politicians. 
  Moreover, as we will see, this two-dimensional political framework and the 
related double political spectrum provide an alternative and empirically sound 
explanation for the electoral viability of the neoliberal Menem government. There is a 
noticeable paradox in the fact that a neoliberal government was mainly supported, 
electorally, by the working and lower classes, while it was at the same time largely 
opposed, electorally, by the middle and upper-middle classes. This paper documents this 4   Ostiguy 
 
apparent anomaly and explains it logically as well as empirically. The two-dimensional 
framework also explains the vicissitudes of the anti-Menem opposition from the left-of-
center Frente Grande (Broad Front, or FG) to the Alianza, the initial “transversal” efforts 
of Nestor Kirchner, and his “retreating” in late 2007 to Peronism. 
Precisely because Argentina’s political space and party system are structured as a 
double political spectrum, it is has been relatively easy and frequent for the Peronist party 
(Justicialist Party, or Partido Justicialista, PJ) leadership and the main anti-Peronist 
parties to leapfrog one another along the left-right axis, without fundamentally altering 
the party system. From 1983 to 1988, the Radical President Raúl Alfonsín moved slowly 
but very consistently to the right
13 (culminating with his choice of Eduardo Angeloz for 
president), while, during that very same period, Peronism moved, inversely, from a 
situation that can only be described as rather chaotic along the left-right axis in 1983–84 
to a position of center-left opposition—with Antonio Cafiero, the “15,” and Carlos 
Menem in 1987–88. In the 1990s, Menem had moved sharply to the right of the political 
spectrum, while Alfonsín, in the 1990s, moved to the left. As if that were not sufficient, 
during and after the 1999 election, the new leader of the Peronist party, Eduardo Duhalde 
(vice-president of the neoliberal Menem), located himself to the center-left of the new 
Radical leader and then president of the country, Fernando de la Rúa, and of his 
administration.
14 In 2002, the Peronist party again spread from left to right, from Nestor 
Kirchner and arguably Adolfo Rodríguez Saá, left of center, to José Manuel de la Sota, 
up to Carlos Menem much on the right. On the political high, the forced movement 
toward the right of the left-of-center Frente País Solidario (Front for a Country in 
Solidarity, or FREPASO) as a junior partner of the right-wing de la Rúa government, was 
very costly for its institutional existence. The same political space it labored hard to 
occupy and unify institutionally, however, has by no mean “disappeared” but was instead 
been taken up by the political newcomer Elisa Carrió and her Alternativa por una 
República de Iguales (Alternative for a Republic of Equals, or ARI). Few actors, 
however, have dared to cross the high-low divide or, moreover, to join in an alliance of 
the extreme low with the extreme high (allied on the basis of similar left-right positions). 
By contrast, ranging across the opposites of the left-right dimension, Ricardo López 
Murphy and Domingo Cavallo, clearly on the right, and the Socialists, on the left, were     Ostiguy   5
 
part of the same government. Similarly, in the 1980s, Jorge Triaca on the low-right, and 
Revolutionary Peronism on the low-left, were even part of the same “party.”
15 In 
Argentina, parties do not leapfrog each other and do stay within delimited political areas, 
as observed on other continents (Adams 2001:122), but they do so mainly along the high-
low dimension in politics, which is also and at the same time the country’s central 
cleavage.
16 
 
 
 
 
  The paper shows and explains in empirical detail how Argentina’s politics is very 
clearly structured as a double political spectrum. It then analyzes how the structuring of 
its political space came into existence, in its contemporary form, in the 1940s. To that 
end, it employs the fundamental concepts presented and defined in Ostiguy (2009). As I 
show in this paper, the fact that the left-right and high-low dimensions are each made up 
of two, closely related subdimensions opened up possibilities for incremental but swift 6   Ostiguy 
 
redefinitions of the axis of political competition in Argentina. Actors’ dynamic 
exploitation of those possibilities from 1943 to 1946 led to the eventual freezing of the 
Peronist/anti-Peronist political divide in high-low, rather than left-right, terms. Once 
consolidated, this double political spectrum in Argentina has remained remarkably 
durable over the decades, from the 1960s to the present. While Chilean politics, for 
example, has been largely structured along a left-right spectrum (with the secular-
religious difference perhaps being a secondary dimension), Argentine politics has been 
and continues to be structured politically by the high-low cleavage, with the orthogonal 
left-right dimension playing an important but comparatively somewhat secondary role.  
  The central contribution of this paper is to lay out the structure of Argentina’s 
political space. In doing so, using our basic structure the paper also dynamically explains, 
empirically, what may be called the paradox of Menemism, alluded to above. It also 
helps to account for the differentiated social reception that Menemism and the political 
opposition to it each received in Argentine society. It also explains the “continuity in 
difference,” in the 2000s. 
  The present two-dimensional framework and the double political spectrum, first 
conceived in an admittedly more rudimentary way by the author as a student back in the 
mid-1980s, seems as vital today (2000, 2009)
17 as it was more than two decades ago, 
despite the many and drastic changes of institutional actors that have occurred in the 
Argentine political arena. It now also seems altogether likely that this double political 
spectrum and more broadly this structured two-dimensional space will have a few more 
decades of continuing existence. 
 
HIGH AND LOW IN ARGENTINE POLITICS 
AND ARGENTINA’S DOUBLE POLITICAL SPECTRUM 
 
The High and the Low in Politics: Appeals, Identities, and Political Positioning
18 
 
High and low are poles of a dimension in politics; they are neither social groups nor 
social strata, even though the high-low dimension in politics does have social 
implications. The fascinating relation between the social and the political is studied 
empirically in this paper. Second, this political space is about political appeals, a broad     Ostiguy   7
 
but indispensable category discussed in detail earlier in this series (Ostiguy 2009). Most 
definitely, programs—whether economic or issue related—can be used, and are used, as 
appeals in politics. Third, recurrent appeals can lead to the creation of, be associated with, 
or keep alive certain political identities, as is the case in Argentina—or they may not, 
especially if given appeals crosscut a different, already constituted political divide. 
Certainly, identities imply a much longer time frame than a single political appeal. For 
this reason, political identities are usually linked to a political cleavage, and the most 
common political identities in a polity are in fact a constitutive component of that polity’s 
main political cleavage. Fourth, in my view, neither pole of the high-low is, in and of 
itself, more “democratic” than the other, even though each clearly relates, in its own 
specific way, to key components of democracy. 
The high-low dimension is, just like left and right, made up of two subdimensions 
or components (see Figure 2). These subdimensions, again like those constitutive of left 
and right, are at sharp angles in relation to one another, i.e., are highly correlated. 
Positions on the high-low dimension, however, may be more difficult to change in a fully 
credible way than left-right positioning, itself quite unstable in the case of many Latin 
American politicians. High and low can be said to be about recognition and 
identification, whether these are with issue position and/or politicians. While some would 
like to see high and low as “only” about “political style,” they actually connect deeply 
with a society’s history, its group identities and, quite often, resentments, and with 
differing criteria for assessing what is likeable and normatively acceptable. 
 
The first component of the high-low axis is the social-cultural appeal in politics. 
This component has to do with manners, demeanors, ways of speaking and dressing, and 
tastes displayed in public. On one pole, people publicly present themselves as well 
behaved,
19 proper, composed, and perhaps even bookish. Negatively, they can appear as 
stiff, rigid, serious, colorless, somewhat distant, and boring. On the other pole, people 
frequently use a language that includes slang or folksy expressions and metaphors, are 
more demonstrative in their bodily or facial expressions as well as in their demeanor, and 
display more raw, culturally popular tastes. Politicians on the low are capable of being 
more uninhibited in public and are more apt to use coarse or popular language. They 8   Ostiguy 
 
often appear—at least to the observer on the high—as more “colorful.” While one may 
wish to call this dimension class-cultural, I have found that it is empirically most closely 
correlated, though not synonymous, with educational level. Although concrete 
sociocultural differences exist in all societies, these differences are usually not attached to 
political identities. In some cases, however, sociocultural differences do become 
politicized, in that cultural patterns such as manners, declared tastes, language and mode 
of behavior in public become associated with political identities or political choice.  
The second component of the high-low dimension of appeals in politics is 
political-cultural. This dimension is about forms of political leadership and preferred or 
advocated modes of decision-making in the polity. On one pole, one finds political 
appeals consisting of claims
20 to favor formal, impersonal, legalistic, institutionally-
mediated models of authority. On the other pole, one finds political appeals emphasizing 
personalistic, strong (and generally male) leadership. Personal versus impersonal 
authority is perhaps a good synthesis of this polarity. The pole arguing for impersonal 
authority generally claims to represent “procedural normalcy” (at least as a goal to be 
achieved) in the conduct of public life. The personalist pole generally claims to be much 
closer to “the people” and to represent them better than the pole claiming or arguing for a 
more impersonal, procedural, proper model of authority. In practice, one finds on the low, 
to use Peronist language, the appeals of leaders “con pelotas” (“with balls”), who know 
how to lead the people. To paraphrase Aldo Rico, they “doubt” less (as “doubt is the 
bragging of intellectuals”). The low often entails a preference for decisive action (often at 
the expense of some “formalities”) over the “niceties” that accompany the rule of law. 
These two components of the high-low axis very much have in common, as 
unusual as it may sound in our field of political science, the level of sublimation and of 
suppression that is judged ideal in the exercise of leadership and authority. The high is 
definitely more abstract and restrained, thus claiming to be more proper, whether in 
manners or in procedure. The low is earthier, more concrete, into immediacy.
21 On the 
political-cultural dimension, it can be said that political authority on the low is less 
mediated. Mediation undoubtedly involves a more sublimated type of practice. On the 
social-cultural dimension, however, from the normative standpoint of the high, “cruder” 
and “more refined” are correct descriptions.    Ostiguy   9
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As a last observation, it should be noted that the “immediate” is more concrete, 
immanent, earthy, and culturally localist (“from here”), while the reverse is true of 
abstracting mediation. The high tends to justify its concerns in more abstract terms and to 
convey them through more “universalizing,” less culturally localized language.  
Together, the orthogonal left-right and high-low axes form a two-dimensional 
political space of appeals, in which we locate actors, parties, and politicians. 
Theoretically, as these two axes are fully neutral with regard to one another, any 
combination (for example forming four quadrants) is not only possible, as is the case with 
spaces configured even by non-orthogonal axes, but equally possible. And indeed, in 
Argentina, political actors have settled the entire political space. In this light, strategies of 
political appeal are multiplied because there are equally possible ways of translating 
somewhat similar social contrasts into politics, and thus of appealing to similarly situated 
voters. Each of these ways is then, both in theory and practice, equally combinable with 
any position on the orthogonal dimension. 
 
From “The First Tyranny” to the Second: Sarmiento’s Civilization and Barbarism 
and the Characterization of a Twentieth-Century Cleavage 
 
The high-low axis is deeply rooted in Argentine political and social history. It goes back 
to one of the key founding myths—at least from the high standpoint—of the modern 
Argentine nation: the famous image of “civilization and barbarism.”
22 The myth is 
associated with one of Argentina’s most important nineteenth-century public figures: 
Domingo Sarmiento. For modern Argentina’s founding fathers, the combination of, on 
the one hand, good manners, the frock, urbanity, civility and, on the other, republicanism 
and respect for institutions (i.e., the high pole of each of the two sub-dimensions of the 
high-low axis) stood at the very core of their modernist project for the country. The 
opposite combination, represented by the Federal caudillos’ style of leadership, and their 
gaucho supporters’ uncouth lifestyle (especially in the montoneras, or troops of gaucho 
rebels following a caudillo),
23 constituted their nightmare.  
  Sarmiento saw the Argentine hinterland, its “essence,” as fundamentally 
“barbaric,” primitive, unsophisticated, indomitable, and careless.
24 This barbarism had to 
be eradicated, together with the lawless and brutish caudillos to which it gave rise, and be     Ostiguy   11
 
replaced by “civilization.” The latter corresponded to an idealized version of literate, 
cultured, and self-disciplined northwestern Europe. The project indeed triumphed 
politically during the second half of the nineteenth century. 
  Of course, the actual behavior and demeanor of the immigrants, who flooded 
Buenos Aires and the provinces of the littoral en masse from Southern and Eastern 
Europe, did not actually correspond to this idealized image of cultured and polished, 
urbane, self-disciplined Europeans. In the first half of the twentieth century, the notion of 
“civilization and barbarism” became detached from rural/urban cultural differences—the 
particular rural world depicted in Facundo and later in Martín Fierro was becoming 
extinct—and the polarity attached itself to class differences instead (see Svampa 1994). 
The popular sectors, with their rude manners and often disorderly conduct, became a 
threat, especially when acting under the influence of radical anarchism, to the liberal 
oligarchic project that had become dominant. To put it schematically, in that structuring 
dichotomy, the urban worker started to replace the gaucho. In the 1940s, as we will see, 
Perón came to be characterized negatively by the opposition as the new caudillo, the new 
Juan Manuel de Rosas, the “second tyranny.”
25 With the workers (many of whom 
originated from the hinterland) taking the place of Sarmiento’s gauchos, and with Perón 
as the new Rosas, the newly emerging anti-”Peronist” opposition politically recreated in 
its full strength Sarmiento’s founding dichotomy between “civilization” and “barbarism.” 
By the 1960s, the Peronist left adopted this characterization, but reversed its normative 
poles. The Montoneros (of the militant Movimiento Peronista Montonero, or Montonero 
Peronist Movement) were created, taking their name from such a characterized 
nineteenth-century repertoire, while, under the influence of historical revisionism 
(originally on the right in the 1930s), the Peronist left started to revere Rosas as well as 
all of the nineteenth-century Federal caudillos. This type of political labeling became 
very widespread. Even within the armed forces, the two sides in an armed conflict 
between Peronist sympathizers and anti-Peronists in 1962 named themselves, 
respectively, the “crude” and the “cooked.” 
  This set of oppositions and hailings do not pertain only to the realm of symbolic 
dichotomies used to hail and name Argentine political adversaries.
26 Argentina is in fact 
spectacular, by world standards, in the extremes that it reaches on the concrete, 12   Ostiguy 
 
measurable,
27 high-low axis. The range stretches all the way from the aesthetic and 
cultural refinement of Jorge Luis Borges, whose disdain for Peronism also reached 
unprecedented levels (and who has been accused, not unjustly, of elitism and 
“foreignizing” orientations), to the brutish and boorish ex-Peronist gubernatorial 
candidate Herminio Iglesias, who could not conjugate properly in Spanish and who was 
widely linked to criminal activities in the Buenos Aires district of Avellaneda. Borges 
and Iglesias both have been eminently politicized, each becoming a political symbol 
vilified by those on the opposite side of the Peronist/ anti-Peronist divide. Peronists 
viewed Borges as the most virulent figure of what anti-Peronism stands for 
socioculturally,
28 while anti-Peronists viewed Iglesias as the worst sociocultural 
embodiment of Peronism.  
 
The High-Low Political Spectrum and Polarity in Argentina 
 
There exists a vast spectrum ranging between these two poles. The high may be divided 
into extreme and moderate variants. The very-high is manifestly well-read, cultured, and 
displays a high level of cultural or technical capital. Though numerically small, this 
position is endowed with significant symbolic and institutional capital. It ranges from the 
“Althusserian” left of the 1970s, to Socialist intellectuals on the center-left, to well-
mannered and cultured public figures like television host Mariano Grondona on the right.  
The moderate-high has a cultural outlook that resembles that of the middle sectors 
of developed countries. While such an outlook is quite hegemonic in societies like the 
US, in Argentina it is only one position among many, and not even the socially 
predominant one. Politicians representing this position have been drawn from parties all 
along the left-right spectrum. They include human rights (and later FREPASO) leader 
Graciela Fernández Meijide, Unión Cívica Radical (Radical Civic Union, UCR) leaders 
such as Raúl Alfonsín and Federico Storani, Peronist deputy Miguel Ángel Toma, and 
neoliberal television host Bernardo Neustadt. A large number of moderate-high 
politicians are from the Federal Capital, which has an average income and level of 
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  The low may also be divided into moderate and extreme tendencies. The 
moderate-low is characterized by a conspicuously informal style in politics. It is very 
“Latin” in that it is very “warm,” “casual,” demonstratively affectionate publicly, and 
“fun.” From a high perspective, it is often tacky. Examples include “historical” PJ 
politicians such as Domingo Mercante, Héctor (“the uncle”) Cámpora, and Antonio 
Cafiero, as well as more recent PJ candidates like pop singer Palito (“Little Stick”) 
Ortega and boating champion Daniel Scioli. The use of nicknames to designate moderate-
low politicians and public figures—a phenomenon impossible to imagine for the very-
high—should be underscored. In terms of known political writers, Arturo Jauretche, with 
his informal mode of expression (despite his serious content), is a good example of the 
moderate-low. The Peronist intellectual magazine Unidos is an expression of this style 
closer to us in time, in sharp contrast to high political magazines such as Punto de Vista 
or Ciudad Futura. 
   The very-low has “balls” (pelotas); it is rougher and led by “real men” who can 
“lead the people” and do not hesitate on the means to “get things done.” The term 
“caudillo” is clearly used here as a term of praise. Socioculturally, the very-low is 
associated with the milieu of the urban lower sectors—particularly with the masculine 
skills required for survival and respect in this environment—as well as with the most 
rural areas, especially those of the northern interior. Writing of the “inorganic 
democracy” that developed between leaders and masses in the nineteenth century, J. L. 
Romero describes the caudillistic mode of political representation in the following way:  
The caudillo depended on the masses and gained popular support by exacerbating 
class feeling. He generally stood out because of the excellence with which he 
practiced the virtues they admired: he was the bravest, the most daring, the most 
skillful” (1963 [1946]: 109–110).
29 
 
Linked to these leadership aspects is the typical (in the view of many anti-Peronists) 
very-low practice of patoterismo, that is, of intimidation with the aim of “sending a 
message”
30 or securing physical spaces (walls, space in a rally) for political proselytism.  
  Although anti-Peronists tend to view such self-styled “caudillismo” as “barbaric” 
and “appalling,” it is an image that low politicians self-consciously maintain. Thus, 
Carlos Menem, while campaigning in his own rugged northern province of La Rioja, 14   Ostiguy 
 
declared: “They are branding us as ruffians. But from this manly and brave La Rioja, I 
can tell you that it is better to be a ruffian than a traitor selling out the fatherland.”
31 
Menem in the 1970s and 1980s, with his huge sideburns and horseback rides in a poncho, 
is a clear example of a very-low appeal. Other examples include Peronists like Herminio 
Iglesias, the Saadi Clan, and Luis Barrionuevo, as well as ex-Carapintada
32 leader Aldo 
Rico. 
  High-low differences are reinforced by the images that each side holds of the 
other. Anti-Peronists tend to be appalled by very-low Peronists. They characterize them 
as bestias, or uncultured boors, and as lacking in ethics or principles. They associate 
symbols such as the Peronist March, mass rallies, and bombos (large, very loud drums) 
with the “negros
33 and undisciplined, loutish, and violent behavior. These sociocultural 
and politico-cultural traits frustrate the anti-Peronists’ desired image of Argentina as a 
“normal” country, of largely European descent. Peronists, by contrast, view anti-Peronists 
as snobbish, distant, cold-hearted, and full of highfalutin language. They also tend to 
view anti-Peronists’ cosmopolitan orientation as putting on “European airs” and even 
being unpatriotic.  
  Figure 3 captures the politicized characterizations, at the mass level, of each side 
of the Peronist/anti-Peronist divide. In line with the definition of high and low already 
provided, it does so in three domains of characterization: the sociocultural; the political 
leadership or mode authority said to be preferred; and the historically important 
politicized adjectives regarding the cultural relation to the “outside/abroad” and the 
“inside/hinterland” (afuera and interior) of the country. 
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Argentina’s Double Political Spectrum 
Argentine politics has historically been organized along a double political spectrum, 
composed of two parallel spectra, each ranging from left to right. In other words, each 
position along the left-right political axis is multiplied by two. The high-left is occupied 
by Marxist and Socialist organizations. Historically, both the Communist and Socialist 
parties were internationalist in orientation and heavily influenced by intellectual debates 
abroad. A Peronist worker described the Communists as: “regimented like little tin can 
soldiers. …They have too disciplined a view for Argentines” (quoted in Ranis 1992:126-
27). The Communists moreover maintained a certain bookish orientation, prizing 
theoretical “rigor” and placing a greater emphasis on abstract and professorial 
explanations of society than on working class mobilization. Marxism is, of course, highly 
theoretical: even its terminology (bourgeois, proletarian) is more abstract and less 
“commonsensical” than the Peronist categories of pueblo (people), descamisados 
(shirtless), and humildes (poor, humble people). The Socialists also emphasized book 
learning. Indeed, the Socialist Club served as a meeting place for some of Argentina’s 
most sophisticated and highbrow intellectuals. Socialist Party appeals centered more on 
ethical public behavior, honesty, and citizens’ rights than on worker mobilization. Indeed, 
before the advent of Peronism, the Socialist Party distinguished itself through its efforts 
to promote public libraries and conferences in popular neighborhoods (Romero 1986; 
Romero and Gutiérrez 1989 and 1995; Romero 2006) and—”higher” still—through its 
campaign against drinking and smoking among the working class.  
  The low-left is quite different. Low-left groups such as the Montoneros and the 
Peronist Youth (Juventud Peronista, or JP) also considered themselves socialist and 
revolutionary; but their rhetoric and appeals were infinitely much cruder and less 
intellectualized than the Marxist and socialist parties, which they disliked, viewed as “in 
the clouds” and as not understanding the concrete reality and ways of the Argentine 
people. The Montoneros took their name from the hordes of Federal horsemen (presented 
as “barbaric” in the established, older liberal view of Argentine history), made up of 
unkempt, lower-class, and fierce gauchos, in their localist fight against Buenos Aires’ 
centralizing and “civilizing” Unitarians. They identified with Eva Perón, whom they 
viewed as a social revolutionary dedicated to the poor and the “shirtless,” and they     Ostiguy   17
 
emphasized the anti-oligarchic, mobilizational, and socially redistributive aspects of 
Peronism. Unlike the bookish high-left, the rhetoric of the low-left was often extremely 
crude. Thus, typical JP chants included: “Hard, hard, hard...they shove it up their ass. 
Now, now, those of the Libertadora suck our balls” and “the working class wants the 
stick, to make the sons of bitches dance.” In the 1990s, a representative of the low-left 
was union leader Carlos “The Dog” Santillán.  
  The high-center emphasizes ethics, civic behavior, and proceduralism. Steeped in 
liberal theory, it has a long tradition of defending the rule of law, civic rights, pluralism, 
and republican institutions. Its discourse is more about the citizenry than the pueblo. 
Since the late nineteenth century, the high-center space has been occupied mostly by the 
Radical Civic Union. Always more civic than radical, the UCR has long been associated 
with mild manners, a minimum of propriety, and tolerance. Inversely, it has been 
associated with meek governments, incapable or unwilling to grab “the bull by the horns” 
and refusing to build strong alliances with the concrete “factors of power,” relying 
instead on the vaguer concept of “citizen mandate.” The UCR has traditionally 
encompassed factions that range from the center-left to the center-right. Although its 
economic program has varied across time, it has generally adhered to center or center-left 
programs such as developmentalism and Keynesianism.  
  The low-center, since the 1940s, has been occupied by “classical” or 
“mainstream” Peronism–although several minor provincial parties are also located on the 
low center-right. As with the high-center Radical governments of Illia and Alfonsín, the 
low-center has been associated with a mixed economy, the import substitution model, and 
a role of the state in public welfare, while being decidedly non-revolutionary and anti-
communist. In contrast to the Radical governments, however, such policies are associated 
in their low variant with the concrete needs of the humildes or the pueblo, rather than 
with such abstract ideas as being “progressive” and “civic” or with economic theories 
(such as Keynesianism). Low-center politicians are more likely to focus on simply 
“delivering the goods.” Furthermore, politicians on the low always claim to be “true 
representatives” of the local setting, and to “get things done.” While politicians on the 
high often aim for the moral high ground, politicians on the low claim to be “rooted” or, 
as it seems from the high, appear as colorful, backward, or simply “appalling.” In the 18   Ostiguy 
 
rural setting of La Rioja, a vivid example of the low-center in the 1980s was its Governor 
Carlos Menem, the “Tiger of Anillaco,” with his huge sideburns and galloping horse 
rides in poncho. Representatives of the low-center include powerful union leaders such as 
Augusto Vandor and Lorenzo Miguel (with their thuggish image and pragmatic, “bread 
and butter” orientation) and “traditional” Peronist leaders such as Eduardo Duhalde and 
(higher) Antonio Cafiero, or the founding Peronist figure Domingo Mercante. 
  The high-right believes in rationality and efficiency (though often not 
democracy), and it has often adopted a class-conscious interpretation of what 
“civilization” is. Often associated with the “oligarchy” and its institutions, such as the 
Rural Society and the Jockey Club, as well as with—at times—its military allies, the 
high-right is economically conservative and culturally cosmopolitan. It is certainly very 
fond of order (for capital accumulation and “progress”) and has been described by 
O’Donnell (1973: 78–82) in his writings on “technocratic roles.” Like the high-left, it 
tends to be European—or (here) US—oriented and thus prone to attacks on the low for 
being “anti-Argentine.” Representatives of the high-right include Borges, conservative 
leader Álvaro Alsogaray, ex-military dictator Jorge Videla, and Economic Ministers such 
as José Martinez de Hoz and (lower) Domingo Cavallo. In the post-1983 period, the high-
right space was filled by the Unión de Centro Democrático (Union of the Democratic 
Center, or UCeDe) and, less significantly, several (lower) provincial parties. 
  The low-right, by contrast, tends to be nativist, ultra-nationalist, and, importantly, 
oriented toward strong (male) leadership. Unlike the cosmopolitan high-right, it claims to 
be rooted in the particular cultural traits of the “people of the nation.” The low-right 
places a strong emphasis on authority and social order, is staunchly anti-leftist, and is 
generally pro-military. It tends to emphasize strict loyalty (verticalismo, or “verticalism”) 
to the conductor (leader). Whereas the rhetorical focus of the Peronist left is on the 
“shirtless” or lo popular (the popular), the Peronist right focuses on the Argentine nation 
(instead of the pueblo), the flag (instead of the rags), and lo nacional (more than lo 
popular). Representatives of the low-right include orthodox Peronist leaders such as 
Herminio Iglesias, Isabelista minister José López Rega, conservative unionists such as 
Jorge Triaca and Armando Cavalieri, and, certainly, Alberto Brito Lima. In its more 
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nationalism, and a fascination with violence. Examples of the extreme low-right include 
paramilitary groups such as Comando de Organización (literally, the “Organization 
Commando”) and arguably the Iron Guard in the 1970s, the Carapintada military rebels 
in the 1980s, and the officially non-Peronist Movement for Dignity and National 
Independence (Movimiento por la Dignidad y la Independencia Nacional, or MODIN)—
led by the crude and “macho” Aldo Rico—in the 1990s.
34 
  Despite the fact that left-right differences between low and high groups were 
often quite narrow, alliances or defections across the Peronist/anti-Peronist cleavage were 
extremely infrequent. Thus, whereas voters and sometimes public figures frequently 
oscillated between the Socialists and the Radicales (both of which put strong discursive 
emphasis on public ethics, civic behavior, and cultural capital), there has been 
remarkably little cooperation or party switching between the Socialists and labor-based 
left-of-center Peronists. Although these groups always shared a similar socioeconomic 
program, the sociocultural distance between them is enormous. A similar phenomenon 
occurred on the right, where conservative elites and right-wing Peronists shared an 
antipathy toward “subversives” but rarely spontaneously cooperated. Intra-cleavage 
alliances are much more common. Thus, Socialists, Radicals, and high conservatives 
could come together in the Democratic Union in 1946 and the Alliance in 1997, while 
Peronism aligned with (and absorbed) the low-right MODIN in the late 1990s. 
 
GENESIS AND EVOLUTION OF ARGENTINA’S ENDURINGLY  
STRUCTURED POLITICAL SPACE 
 
We will now analyze how this double political spectrum came about in Argentina, and 
then trace its durability, decade after decade (during which the historical context changed 
drastically), up to the contemporary period. The centrality of the high-low divide also 
explains why political groupings with otherwise similar left-right positions routinely 
align in opposite camps or appeal to different social bases. 20   Ostiguy 
 
The Critical Juncture: The Rise of Peronism and the Creation of the Double 
Political Spectrum (1943–1946)  
 
Between 1943 and 1946, Argentine politics experienced a remarkable series of shifts 
along dimensions defining political conflict. In the immediate wake of the 1943 military 
coup, a left-right divide was clearly discernible, as a right-wing nationalist military 
regime, focusing on order and authority, confronted a leftist, internationalist, and liberal-
democratic opposition led primarily by students and intellectuals.
35 Although neither side 
mobilized the working and lower classes, the leftist opposition was more ideologically 
disposed to a working-class alliance than was the government.  
  During 1944 and early 1945, however, the axis defining political conflict began to 
shift from the left-right dimension to the high-low dimension. First, the nationalist right 
lost much of its power within the military regime. Second, in the face of mounting 
opposition by civil society and a changed international climate due to the victory of the 
Allies, the military regime took steps to democratize in mid-1945, announcing (clean) 
elections to be held before the end of the year. Third, there arose within the regime a 
strong leader, not overly attached to procedural rule, who combined a nationalist and 
localist discourse with a culturally popular demeanor and redistributive socioeconomic 
policies.  
  While it is well known that then Labor and Social Security Secretary Perón built 
working-class support through a range of economically pro-labor policies, he was at the 
same time the very first Argentine politician to make systematic appeals on the low. 
Though tame by today’s standards, these appeals were highly controversial in the 
Argentina of the 1940s.
36 It included using an informal, very colloquial style and popular 
slang; culturally marked actions such as taking off his jacket at public rallies; and his 
relationship with Evita, who had a reputation for promiscuity linked to her job as an 
actress and her social background. According to Silberstein, Perón,  
talked to the workers in their own language.... [He] was the one who made politics 
fun, who allowed one to dance in the street, to shout well- or ill-intentioned songs, 
full of happiness and swearing at the top of one’s voice; who took off his shirt and 
stayed in shirt sleeves, like one does at work or at home; [and] who spoke against 
the bosses, against the oligarchs, those who sold out the motherland (Silberstein 
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Throughout 1944–45, the effect of Perón’s combined socioeconomic and socio-
cultural appeal, together with some police measures directed at non-cooperative leftist 
union leaders, was to increase the potential importance of the working and lower classes 
as an effective source of political support for Perón himself, more than for the 
“Revolution of 1943” itself. This social support materialized in the mythical founding 
event of Peronism: the spontaneous mass rally of October 17, 1945, at which a multitude 
of workers demanded the liberation of “their” Colonel, who had been imprisoned by 
regime soft-liners.
37 In his famous October 17 speech from the presidential balcony 
following his release, Perón fused the regime’s nationalism and concern for order with 
his own personal leadership and the culturally popular: 
Workers!...This is the suffering pueblo that represents the pain of the motherland, 
which we will vindicate...Mingled with this sweating mass, I hug you all hard and 
long against my heart, as I would do with my mother....From this hour,...may 
Colonel Perón be the link of union that will make the brotherhood between the 
pueblo, the army, and the police indestructible. May this union be eternal so that 
this pueblo grows in the spirit of the...authentic forces of nationality and order.
38 
 
  As a result of these shifts, what had been a nationalist, pro authority-and-order, 
clerical, and overall right-wing project could certainly not, by 1945, be defined as right-
wing in terms at least of one of the two subdimensions of left and right.
 39 Politically, it 
was now clearly on the low in both subdimensions of high and low.  
  The nature of the opposition also, and at the very same time, changed 
considerably during 1945. What had once been a left-wing democracy movement against 
military rule shifted into a “civic” coalition, politically on the high. With the inclusion of 
the main, Alvearista (or ex-President Marcelo T. de Alvear’s “Alvearist”) wing of the 
UCR in mid-1945, the opposition movement became a civic-republican front demanding 
free elections, the rule of law, and an immediate return to constitutional rule. Interpreting 
the rise of Perón as the advent of a (pro-Axis) “above procedures” strong leader with a 
mass following, these opposition forces came to view the regime as not so much a 
conservative military dictatorship but, now and in light of the above, as essentially 
mobilizational, demagogical, and “fascist.” 
  With the launching of Perón’s presidential candidacy, subsequent to the October 
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continued to shift even more. The dimension defining the political conflict between 
“Perón-ism” and its opponents was now entirely, as well as conspicuously, high-low. The 
opposition forces, in reaction to what they viewed as Perón’s “demagogic” leadership 
style, began to talk of “morality in politics,” “legality,” “the calming of passions,” and the 
“educated efforts of the citizenry.”
40 UCR leaders declared, for example, that  
with a cynicism unprecedented in the annals of civility, against all norms of 
respect and social cohabitation...the country suffers the asphyxia of its essential 
rights and is at the mercy of a sensual and irresponsible coterie which...seeks to 
impose the candidacy of the greatest demagogue of our history.
41  
 
  Increasingly, however, the opposition to Perón took an explicit social-cultural 
turn (see the two subdimensions of high and low in Figure 2). As Halperín notes, the 
opposition was scandalized by Perón’s  
break with a political—and not only political—style on which people located in 
ideologically opposite positions had previously agreed. Since October 17, Perón 
had become the head of the “shirtless,” and this naming was not only symbolic; 
many of his supporters had been seen that day in the street without this garment, 
and although the leader of the movement always refused the invitations of the 
supporting multitude to imitate it, he immodestly displayed himself without a 
coat...These shocking innovations in style reached their most significant level 
with Perón’s marriage to Eva Duarte (Halperín 1991: 54).  
 
  The opposition’s response not only to Perón’s form of political leadership but also 
to his emerging working- and lower-class concrete following crucially became, as well, 
increasingly class-cultural in nature. Luna’s description of the left’s reaction to the 
October 17 mobilization is particularly telling in this regard: 
The Socialist Party and the Communist Party had intellectually elaborated an 
ideal worker, an archetype that looked much like the upright artisan of 
disciplined militancy who came to the popular library, did not drink alcohol or 
smoke, and could cite Marx and Spencer...When the sight of those workers in 
flesh and blood, workers who were not Marxist redeemers but common men 
who sweated, swore, and drank cheap wine...hit them, they chose to deny that 
this was the proletarian reality of the country (1969: 349). 
   
Precisely because of the interpretation they initially developed of the political 
situation from mid-1943 to early 1945, leftists were forced to come up with a reason why 
people from the popular sectors would follow a leader who was “obviously” not on the 
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with an account that depicted Perón’s followers not as workers (allegedly still 
communists, socialists, etc.) but as part of the lumpen proletariat: hoodlums, ruffians, 
drunkards, prostitutes.
42 From left to right, oddly enough, many public figures on the high 
started to conflate “barbarism from above” (that of Perón, Rosas, the caudillos) with 
“barbarism from below” (that of the “hordes”, the “lumpen,” the malón or Indian raid, the 
gaucho montoneras) (Svampa 1994: 253): that is, an authoritarian and culturally nativist 
demagogue with unruly and dangerous “hordes.” 
The opposition actually played a central role in the sociocultural turn of the 
campaign, inventing a variety of imaginative new sociocultural terms to denigrate 
Perón’s followers. Interestingly, these terms were often re-appropriated by the Peronists. 
An example is the epithet “shirtless,” which, though originally employed as an insult by 
the Socialist La Vanguardia, was quickly adopted by Perón and transformed into a point 
of pride.
43 
The transformation of the opposition was completed when the conservative 
economic elites, responding to Perón’s statist and redistributionist economic program, 
finally joined the anti-Perón coalition, started in 1943 by Communists and Socialists. At 
this point, it no longer made sense at all to characterize the Peronist/anti-Peronist 
cleavage in the left-right terms of 1943. The final result was a broad alliance of leftists, 
“proper” middle sectors, and big business, all claiming to favor the “constitution” and 
republicanism. Thus, the Democratic Union that opposed Perón in 1946 included the 
Communist and Socialist parties, the bulk of the UCR, and the conservative Argentine 
Industrial Union (Unión Industrial Argentina, or UIA). 
The 1946 electoral campaign brought sociocultural as well as politico-cultural 
issues to the fore, establishing them as a constitutive element of Peronist and anti-
Peronist identities. On one side was Perón, taking his coat off, using slang expressions, 
engaging in informal practices, and—a highly personalist strong leader—followed by 
crude murgas (boisterous “carnavalesque” street dancers) and unruly so-called “hordes.” 
On the other side, the opposition emphasized propriety and civic behavior, as well as 
institutions, claiming high-level abstract principles.  
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  A highly significant theoretical finding of this section is the fact that, at least in 
the case of Argentina in the 1940s, the two parts of Figure 2 (the two subdimensions of 
high-low; the two subdimensions of left-right) can, conceptually and theoretically, be 
superimposed upon one another (as a “wheel”). In this way, Figure 2 gives rise to Figure 
4. Figure 4 theoretically and historically orders the narrative of this section on the 1940s. 
The superimposition of the ordered subdimensions of left-right and of high-low on a two-
dimensional, “flat” space thus importantly gives rise, graphically and conceptually, to a 
360 “wheel” of axes of appeals in politics.
44 In it, all of the subdimensions of Figure 2, 
together, form “spikes” or axes that define potential—and in this actual case, very real—
ordered political divides 
  During the key 1943–46 period, since no original actors deserted the coalitions as 
the conflict incrementally but rapidly shifted from one dimension to the other, the broad 
political configurations shown in the gray areas of Figure 4 formed and later crystallized. 
In fact, the different thematic, political areas (the outer ring of Figure 4) of these two 
broad configurations have constituted, since then, important elements of Peronism and 
anti-Peronism, as well as of their corresponding identities. While these elements were 
separate and arguably unrelated before 1943, they thus gradually became recognizable 
elements of Peronist and anti-Peronist identities. Moreover, once they congealed as a 
political divide after this critical juncture, they also became quite recognizable 
components (on the structuring left-right and high-low axes) of the double political 
spectrum. 
 
The Durability of the Double Political Spectrum  
 
Just as the military coup of 1955, directed specifically against Peronism, and the military 
coups of 1966 and 1976, directed at the political game as a whole, failed to destroy 
Peronism, they also failed to transform the Argentine party system and, more 
importantly, the double political spectrum ordering it. The post-1955 period saw the 
emergence of a variety of new political forces, but these groups’ positions and alliances 
reinforced the high-low cleavage rather than crosscutting or blurring it. And although 
Peronism and its opponents underwent substantial changes along the left-right axis, their 
positioning on the high-low axis remained relatively stable. 26   Ostiguy 
 
 
The 1960s and the 1970s. The 1955 “Liberating Revolution” sought to transform 
Argentine politics by eradicating the “anomaly” of Peronism. Many military, 
intellectuals, and socioeconomic elites viewed the post-1955 period as an opportunity to 
restore “normalcy” after more than a decade of “tyranny” and “boorishness.” Thus, 
shortly after Perón’s overthrow, Borges published “L’illusion comique,” or “The Comic 
Illusion,” which described the Perón period as one of  
opprobrium and foolery, [during which] the canons of pulp fiction were applied to 
the government of the Republic. There were two stories: one of a criminal 
nature...and the other of a staged nature, made up of stupidity or gross ignorance 
and fairy tales for the consumption of boors and bumpkins (1955: 9–10).  
 
  Yet efforts to stamp out Peronism and the political low were a failure. Though 
radically transformed by Perón’s overthrow, Peronism not only survived but moved even 
further to the low. A period of non-institutional violence by the working-class Peronist 
resistance responded to the anti-Peronist campaign of the “libertadora”
45 (or so-called 
“liberating”) government. Later, under the liberal semi-democratic
46 governments of 
Arturo Frondizi and Arturo Illia, Peronist circles emerged and grew, throughout the 
1960s and 1970s, where a more “intellectual” and militant leadership were reappropriated 
the negative characterizations of both the nineteenth-century federal camp as depicted by 
liberal historiography and of the Peronists by anti-Peronists. This reappropriation of the 
“barbaric,” so to speak , included the claiming of both the “tyranny” of the caudillo Rosas 
(especially on the Peronist right) and of the roaming montoneras (especially on the 
Peronist left). At the same time, Sarmiento and Juan Bautista Alberdi as historical 
figures, and Borges as a cultural one, became national foes.
47 
  The endurance of politicized high-low differences meant that left-right conflicts 
continued to be crosscut by the high-low axis, and, as a result, each position along the 
left-right axis continued to be multiplied by two, as mapped in Figure 5.   
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On the radical left, in the 1970s, two distinct guerrilla organizations prospered. 
The People’s Revolutionary Army (Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo, or ERP) was 
Marxist and internationalist. It hoisted the red flag and took the struggles of the—rather 
foreign—Vietcong as a model.
48 The ERP boasted of having a theoretically clear political 
line, as is often the case with the Marxist left. Clearly to its right stood the pro-Soviet 
Communist Party. 
On the very low-left, in contrast, were the Montoneros and the JP. Much more 
nationalist than the ERP, and also very crude in their political rhetoric, the Montoneros 
took their name from the montoneras, described above, and claimed to fight in the name 
of the poor, the shirtless, or the “true Argentine people,” i.e., the “people of Perón,” more 
than to follow a Marxist line or other internationalist ideologies. Although the 
Montoneros, like the ERP, recruited heavily from among the radicalized middle-class 
youth, it was a fascination with the pueblo, the slums, and the so-called descamisados—
more than with revolutionary heroes like Che Guevara—that attracted Montoneros 
militants. Unlike those of the bookish high-left, the discourse and slogans of the Peronist 
Left in the 1970s were particularly low, as exemplified by slogans such as: “The Peronist 
Youth go out on the street and fight; and if they find a gorila,
49 if they don’t shit on him, 
they piss on him.”
50  
Completely at the other end of the high-low spectrum stood the very high, 
“cultured,” Europe-centered, center-left socialist parties. They also worked within the 
realm of constitutional principles.  
  The center continued to be divided into non- or anti-Peronist high, and Peronist 
low. The high-center was occupied by different wings of the UCR. The UCR suffered 
several divisions during this period, the most important of which was the 1957 split 
between Arturo Frondizi’s Intransigent Radical Civic Union (Unión Cívica Radical 
Intransigente, or UCRI) and Ricardo Balbín’s People’s Radical Civic Union (Unión 
Cívica Radical del Pueblo, or UCRP). The UCRP, which eventually gained recognition 
as the official UCR, positioned itself on the high-center during the Illia presidency 
(1963–66) and then moved to a more center-right position under Balbín in the post-1966 
period. The UCRI attempted to locate itself more to the low and somewhat to the left of 
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voters. In 1963, the UCRI itself divided. The bulk of the party backed progressive 
Buenos Aires governor Oscar Alende, transforming the UCRI—which would later evolve 
into the PI (Partido Intransigente, or Intransigent Party)—into very-moderate-high, left-
of-center party. The rest of the party, led by Frondizi, formed the Movement of 
Integration and Development (Movimiento de Integración y Desarrollo, or MID), which 
moved to the right and, as the party appealing to nationalist industrialists, eventually 
became an ally of the Peronists. In 1973, Alende ran as the leftist candidate of the Alianza 
Popular Revolucionaria (Popular Revolutionary Alliance, or APR front with the new PI 
at its core) and obtained 7.5% of the national vote. In that same election, Balbín, now sole 
representative of the Radical identity, obtained 21.3% of the vote against Perón’s 
candidate, Cámpora. 
  The low-center was occupied by mainstream Peronist factions, such as the “62 
Organizations” union faction, which was led by metalworker leaders Augusto Vandor 
and, after his assassination, Lorenzo Miguel. Although there was little programmatic 
difference between the Illia government and the Vandorista (Vandorist) unions, the two 
were markedly different on the high-low axis. Illia, a delicate, elderly politician who was 
called “the Turtle” by his opponents, believed in proceduralism and the rule of law, and, 
as a result, he never effectively engaged the country’s so-called “factors of power.” By 
contrast, Vandor, Miguel, and other union bosses often flouted legal procedure, relying 
instead on “face-to-face” relationships, back room negotiations, and no small amount of 
intimidation.
51 In the 1960s, orthodox Peronism opposed the radical Illia government. In 
the 1970s, when Peronism came to occupy a very large portion of the Argentine political 
space, orthodox Peronism and the Peronist left waged war with one another. Héctor 
Cámpora, who was Perón’s delegate in Argentina and had the support of the leftist 
Peronist Youth, obtained half of Argentina’s vote as the Peronist candidate. A few 
months later, Perón himself, now just returned to Argentina, obtained an electoral victory 
of unprecedented magnitude: 61.9% of the votes. He died one year later, after beginning 
a move to destroy the low-left on which he had relied while in exile. 
  The high-low political differences were particularly wide on the right. The high-
right included conservative leaders such as Álvaro Alsogaray and Francisco Manrique, 
economists such as Juan and Roberto Alemann, powerful socioeconomic actors such as 30   Ostiguy 
 
the Rural Society and the Argentine Industrial Union, and top military leaders such as 
Jorge Videla, head of the second bureaucratic-authoritarian regime. Alsogaray, a 
landmark of the high-right, has founded, consecutively, four parties from 1957 to the 
1980s; has had very close ties to the military, and was Argentina’s ambassador to the US 
during the first bureaucratic-authoritarian regime. The ex-captain Manrique, minister of 
social welfare during the first bureaucratic-authoritarian regime, obtained the highest 
percentage of the vote ever received by the high-right: 15% in 1973. 
The low-right, which was historically associated with the nationalist and catholic 
right, included Peronist paramilitary groups such as the Comando de Organización (the 
“Organization Commando”) and, in the 1960s and mid-1970s, arguably the Iron Guard.
52 
It also included “The Wizard” (“el brujo”) José López Rega, who became the main 
figure behind the weak presidency of Isabel Perón after Juan Perón’s death in 1974. 
López Rega, a former police chief who once said that “there is nothing like the Argentine 
quebracho (tree) for hitting leftists over the head,”
53 founded the Argentine Anti-
Communist Alliance (Alianza Anticomunista Argentina), which was responsible for the 
killing of many leftists in the 1970s. The orthodox and the Lopezreguistas (supporters of 
López Rega) allied during a time to eliminate the left (especially the Peronist left), but 
differences then grew between the orthodox Miguel, on the very-low center, and López 
Rega, far on the low-right.
54 
  The armed forces were also divided along the high-low axis, with the more 
nationalist wing (the Blues) earning the nickname of crudos (“crude”) and the more pro-
West, anti-Peronist, and bureaucratic wing (the Reds) receiving the nickname of cocidos 
(“cooked”). Although both factions were right-wing and anti-communist, they clashed 
repeatedly and even briefly entered into armed conflict in the early 1960s.  
 
The Post-Transition Period and the 1980s.  
The 1976–83 military dictatorship and the democratic transition that followed brought 
important political and electoral novelties. The far left was decimated by repression, and 
Peronism, weakened by both repression and the failure of its “collaborationist wing” to 
distance itself from the military leadership, suffered its first ever electoral defeat in 1983. 
The experience of the military dictatorship had a major political impact: in the 1980s,     Ostiguy   31
 
people came to strongly value liberal democracy. Inversely, violence and paralegal deeds, 
which had become the main form of political action in the 1970s, were severely 
delegitimized because of the very negative dynamic they had produced. On regime 
issues, the dictatorship therefore had very important consequences. But with regard to the 
structuring of Argentina’s political space, including the names of “institutional” political 
actors (whether parties or public figures) and their location in that space, the two 
bureaucratic-authoritarian experiences produced very little change, as can be observed by 
comparing Figure 5 and Figure 6.
55 The much heralded appearance in the 1980s of a new 
party on the high-right, led by Alsogaray and representing conservative business interests 
in the political arena (Gibson 1990, 1996), was not new; it was Alsogaray’s fourth party. 
Nor did it obtain vote totals superior in magnitude to those of the conservative Manrique 
the previous decade. Similarly, the initial, relatively strong showing of Alende’s PI as a 
third party, with around 6% of the vote in 1985, was also not novel, nor was its electoral 
total superior to that obtained by Alende in the past. In fact, except for the shrinking of 
the Peronist left, the maps of parties, actors, and positions in Argentina’s political space 
in two different decades, in Figure 5 and Figure 6, appear almost indistinguishable from 
one another.  
  The 1980s are a classic instance of the double political spectrum in its pure form. 
The high-low framework is particularly important for the 1980s in that left-right 
differences between the PJ under Cafiero and the UCR under Alfonsín were minimal, to 
such an extent that they do not differentiate the two main parties. More importantly yet, 
the most original, significant, and drastic political moves by key politicians in the 1980s 
both to achieve victory over their internal adversaries and to change their party’s electoral 
fortunes occurred precisely along the high-low dimension, as we shall shortly see. 
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  In the 1980s, on the left and high of the high-low divide, there continued to be a 
handful of small Marxist parties, the most important of which was the new Trotskyite 
Movement to Socialism (Movimiento al Socialismo, or MAS). Although MAS made an 
effort to organize in working-class zones such as greater Buenos Aires, its success was 
limited, and it remained largely a party of intellectual cadres. The aging Socialists stood 
as always on the very-high, left-of-center. The PI located itself, again as always, clearly 
to the low of the Socialists, and more or less at the same point on the left-right axis. The 
PI, Argentina’s third party throughout most of the 1980s, aimed at a mass base, claiming 
to be “national-and-popular” (in contrast to the Socialists), but its electorate was 
predominantly well-educated, young, middle to upper-middle class, and concentrated in 
the capital. The PI program combined typical left proposals such as a moratorium on 
foreign debt payments and the nationalization of the banks and foreign trade with more 
“cultural-left” issues like ecology, citizen participation, and even bicycle lanes in Buenos 
Aires. The very-low left had considerably shrunk, but it was still occupied by the ex-
Montoneros, which formed Intransigence and Mobilization, and later Revolutionary 
Peronism. Left-of-center and on the moderate low, very close to the divide, the 
informally written magazine Unidos (with “Chacho” Álvarez as an editor) stood out, 
representing the left-wing of the Renovation faction. The PI’s profile can be starkly 
contrasted to that of low-left General Labor Confederation leader Saúl Ubaldini, whose 
sociocultural appeal was unambiguously popular. Though similar to higher left parties in 
his opposition to International Monetary Fund policies and calls for socioeconomic 
redistribution, Ubaldini’s socioeconomic discourse was informal and sentimental,
56 
focusing on the humildes. It was also localist and steeped with popular Catholicism, 
including regular invocations of the Virgin Mary and Saint Cayetano (the patron saint of 
labor).  
  The UCR and its different factions continued to be on the high center. Some 
changes occurred, however. In the beginning of the 1980s and after the death of Balbín, 
Raúl Alfonsín was able to win the leadership of the UCR, against the more old-fashioned 
Línea histórica (the self-named Historical Line). Alfonsín’s faction, Renovación y 
Cambio (Renovation and Change), aimed at making the UCR a modern mass party, with 
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“Coordinating Organization”),
57 dealing directly with the factors of power and 
developing a mobilization capability.
58 The low center continued to be occupied by a 
variety of Peronist factions, including, as we shall see, the Renovators on the center-left 
and very near the high-low divide, and—much lower—the so-called Orthodox leaders on 
the center and center-right (Figure 6).  
  On the right, the UCeDe established itself on the very-high right, while Peronists 
such as Triaca and, arguably, Herminio Iglesias stood quite low on the right. More on the 
right, yet, were Rico and the Carapintadas (Painted Faces). The UCeDe, whose leader 
Alsogaray had strong historical ties with military regimes, positioned itself as an “anti-
populist,” privatizing, economically liberal, free market party. It enjoyed the support of 
much of the business community, and its electorate was concentrated in the wealthiest 
neighborhoods of the Federal Capital. Despite efforts by one party leader, Adelina de 
Viola,
59 to “popularize” the party, the UCeDe generally maintained a high sociocultural 
profile. Again, the “cooked” demeanor of many UCeDe leaders contrasted with the 
macho, thug-like image of low right figures such as Herminio Iglesias and Aldo Rico. In 
the 1980s, the Carapintadas were middle-ranking military officers (the leadership was at 
the lieutenant colonel level within the Comando elite troops or special forces) who took 
up arms against the so-called liberal, actually high-right, military command (Norden 
1996: 107–135). They used ultranationalist rhetoric, were fiercely anti-US and anti-
Britain, and espoused a form of Catholic fundamentalism that included constant 
invocations of the Virgin and the Fatherland. While the military command had 
historically favored order and “social cleanliness,” the Carapintadas appealed to “guts,” 
mystical fervor, blood, and nationalism. The Carapintadas became part of Menem’s vast 
electoral campaign coalition and even offered to take up arms, if necessary, to defend a 
Menem Peronist victory at the polls in 1989.
60  
  It would be a highly erroneous conclusion, however, to believe that because the 
Argentine political space remained structured, overall, as a double political spectrum, no 
major, high-stake political positioning game occurred during that decade. The exact 
opposite is true. And it is precisely as a tool for understanding the logic and stakes of the 
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and the high-low, left-right two dimensional space more generally—prove so useful as a 
framework of analysis for Argentine politics.  
  The most important strategic political movements on the part of political actors in 
the 1980s occurred along the high-low dimension. As summarized above, Alfonsín tried 
to relocate the UCR more on the moderate-high, closer to the divide. He thus sought to 
develop a mass movement capability for the UCR; stated that “with democracy, one can 
eat”; dealt directly with the factors of power; and appealed to both middle- and working-
class sectors. He also tried to move the UCR to the center-left, linking it with social-
democracy. At the same time, the PJ lost two national elections: in 1983 and, with its 
worst score, in 1985. Such defeats led to severe questioning on the part of many Peronist 
leaders and strategists. The movement became even more disunited, both along the left-
right axis (a continued legacy of the 1970s) and increasingly along the high-low axis. In 
the 1985 elections in the key province of Buenos Aires, Antonio Cafiero split from the 
orthodox controlled, very-low, and right-of-center provincial PJ, and ran on a separate 
ticket. His Frente Renovador (Renovation Front) won three times as many votes as the 
orthodox Frente Justicialista de Liberación (Justicialist Liberation Front, or FREJULI) 
led by Herminio Iglesias—even though it did come in a distant second to the UCR.
61 This 
victory of Cafiero over the team of Herminio Iglesias in 1985 launched with vigor the 
movement to renovate the PJ, displaced the old guard of Peronism, and moved the image 
of the party itself very clearly upward, eliminating the troublesome very-low. Locating 
the party on the moderate-low made it more competitive facing the UCR. Thus, the 
Renovadores (Renovators) distanced themselves from Peronism’s crude, ultra-plebeian, 
at times ruffian, and also plebiscitarian traditions and cultivated a more “civilized,” 
“professional,” procedurally-oriented, and liberal democratic image—which earned them 
the nickname “suit and tie Peronism.”  
  By 1987, the Renovators were in full control of the party apparatus, and Cafiero 
appeared almost certain to become Argentina’s next president in 1989. In 1987, under 
Cafiero, the now united, modernized and renovated PJ, much nearer the divide on the 
high-low axis as well as on the center-left, defeated the UCR by 41.5% of the vote to 
37.3%. In line with Downsian logic, the party system had clearly converged toward the 
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dimension of Argentina. While Alfonsín at the beginning of the 1980s had made the UCR 
more competitive with regard to Peronism, in the mid-to-late 1980s Cafiero had made the 
PJ look much more like Alfonsinism. On the left-right axis, it could be argued that 
Cafiero was also somewhat to the center-left of a centrist Alfonsín in the mid-to-late 
1980s. 
  Despite those new strategic transformations in terms of political positioning on 
the part of the parties’ leaderships, making each party more acceptable to the historical 
social basis of the other, Peronism and radicalism maintained markedly different social 
bases and sociocultural profiles. Whereas the UCR remained a predominantly middle-
class party, the PJ continued to draw its support primarily from the working and lower 
classes (Ostiguy 1998). And despite the PJ Renovation’s recent “upward” shift, a wide 
sociocultural gulf continued to separate the two parties. Backed by students, intellectuals, 
and the educated middle classes in general, Alfonsín emphasized liberal-high issues such 
as human rights, due process, and republican institutions. He also appointed a large 
number of intellectuals to governmental positions. Attendance at Peronist rallies 
continued to be by the same lower- and working-class crowd, despite Cafiero being 
certainly less captivating for this audience than more typical Peronist orators. Therefore, 
even though appeals matter, especially in strategic behavior, it is clear that followers 
identify not only with leaders but with one another, as part of a movement. In the two 
years between 1985 and 1987, the nature of the respective movements had not, yet, been 
altered. 
  In the PJ, the Renovators not only coexisted with competitors on their lower flank 
but were in fact ultimately defeated by them. In the first open primary of Peronism, in 
1988, Carlos Menem, presenting himself as an outsider from a far-flung province, with 
no support from the party apparatus, located himself very deliberately and credibly on the 
very-low, to challenge Cafiero and his second, De la Sota, within the Peronist electorate. 
He adopted a (credible) very lower-class and nativist image, toured the slums and remote 
areas of the hinterland, had physical contact with the humildes (humble, poor people). 
Against all odds, especially from an institutionalist standpoint, and surprising the serious 
press, Menem defeated Cafiero. Although vague on policy matters, Menem’s 
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and traditional poncho, which he donned as the self-proclaimed reincarnation of 
Sarmiento’s Facundo. Dressed in leather, Menem rode through impoverished 
neighborhoods standing atop a garbage truck draped with Argentine flags. Mothers 
swarmed the truck, lifting children to Menem for his blessing (Cerruti 1993: 241). 
Invoking the Virgin and Perón, Menem asserted that he was putting “one ear on the heart 
of the People and listening with the other to the voice of God” (Cerruti 1993: 236). For 
many, Menem was an old-style caudillo from a backward province who appeared crude, 
self-contradictory, irresponsible, and even circus-like. Menem in 1988 appalled “serious” 
people on the high and, as “Carlitos,” enthralled Peronists on the low.  
  The mistake of Cafiero had been to already position himself against the Radicales 
for the presidential elections of 1989, assuming that he could not really be challenged 
from within Peronism, a “verticalist” movement, in light of the strong institutional hold 
he had on the party apparatus at the time. While located for the electorate as a whole at a 
median position on the high-low axis, he was off base for the average Peronist voter. 
Cafiero also probably played “too high” in an effort to demonstrate the credibility of the 
PJ’s new, higher position on political procedure, pluralism, and fairness of play. Menem, 
on the other hand, was not encumbered by such considerations. He combined all the 
“leftovers”: violent groups from the Peronist right and from the Peronist left; thug-like 
orthodox Peronists; highly personalistic appeals; calls of redemption; etc. 
  The 1989 presidential campaign, between Carlos Menem on the very-low, and 
perhaps right of center, and Eduardo Angeloz, clearly right-of-center and on the high, 
displayed a spectacular and perhaps unprecedented gap on the high-low axis. This gap 
was reflected in the widely different social bases of both candidates. Contemporary 
analysts often forget that the hyperinflationary crisis broke loose after the PJ victory in 
May, during the transition period under a particularly weak lame duck president. 
Throughout his campaign in late 1988 and early 1989, Menem maintained a caudillistic 
leadership style (manifested by his campaign slogan “Follow Me”); a nativistic and 
nationalistic orientation (including vague references to taking back the Malvinas Islands 
by force); and culturally popular demeanor, taste, and behavior. When the economic 
crisis acquired significant proportions in the last month or so of the campaign, Menem’s 
political campaign increasingly took on a populist, redemptive and even mystical quality, 38   Ostiguy 
 
while Angeloz distanced himself from Alfonsín, locating himself clearly to the right 
economically, and emphasizing seriousness and competence to reassure markets. 
  In contrast to Cafiero’s strategy, which fit the theory of convergence toward the 
center, Menem drastically polarized the electorate in late 1988 and early 1989, locating 
himself on the extreme-low.
62 With high levels of mobilization, he defeated the Radicals 
at the polls. After May 15, the economic and social crisis grew entirely out of control, 
and it was clear that the future president (not scheduled to take over until December) 
would have to take very drastic measures, of whatever kind. 
  The continued centrality of high-low differences in the 1980s can be seen in the 
fact that alliances or defections across the Peronist/anti-Peronist cleavage remained 
strikingly infrequent. Despite the fact that left-of-center Peronists like the Renovators had 
more programmatic affinities with the Alfonsinista (Alfonsinist) Radicals and the PI than 
with the right-wing sectors of orthodox Peronism, there were remarkably few instances of 
PJ defections to (or close alliances with) these other progressive forces. Indeed, it was far 
more common to see figures passing from the Marxian intellectual left to the UCR 
government than to see public figures passing between the UCR (or, still less, the 
cultured and “ethical” Socialists) and Peronism. In the same vein, even though the 
UCeDe and the Peronist right both despised “subversives” and “social democrats,” it 
would never have occurred to orthodox Peronists to align with the UCeDe against the 
left-of-center tendency that gained control of the PJ in the late 1980s. 
 
THE PARADOX OF MENEMISM: APPEALS, RECEPTION,  
AND PARTY SYSTEM IN THE 1990s
63 
 
The double political spectrum helps to explain a major puzzle in contemporary Argentine 
politics: working- and lower-class support for Menemism and middle-class opposition to 
it. As is well-known, the Menem government implemented a set of neoliberal or 
“Thatcherite” economic policies that ran directly counter to the traditional Peronist 
program, and which appeared to place the PJ on the right of the party system. Yet 
Peronism’s social and electoral bases remained solidly working class and lower class. At 
the same time, the UCR and the emerging FREPASO positioned themselves to the left of 
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neoliberal reforms. Yet both of these parties drew the bulk of their support from middle- 
and upper-middle-class voters who, in many cases, most benefitted from the economic 
reforms. Paradoxically, then, the popular sectors massively supported the right-wing 
Menem government, while large sectors of the middle and upper- middle classes opposed 
it.  
  This section argues that Menem was able to maintain his lower-class base 
because, while he did indeed shift markedly to the right, his positioning with regard to the 
high-low divide remained stable. Although parties such as FREPASO and the UCR 
positioned themselves to the left of the PJ, their appeals were too on the high to capture a 
substantial fraction of the traditional Peronist vote (see Figure 7). It also argues that 
although left-right differences had an important impact on the party system in the early 
1990s, FREPASO’s consolidation as a high-center party, followed by the formation of 
the Alliance, showed that the high-low axis remained predominant in Argentine politics.  
 
The Puzzle  
A central paradox of Menemism is that the PJ enjoyed the massive support of the lower 
sectors of society throughout the 1990s, despite the fact that these voters were the least 
supportive of the Menem government’s neoliberal policies (Ostiguy 1998: 464–479). At 
the same time, the bulk of the middle- and upper-middle-class electorate, much of which 
backed the government’s economic policies, remained hostile to Menem and continually 
voted against the PJ (Ostiguy 1998: 380–391; 471–479). Menem’s neoliberal policies and 
alliance with big business, the UCeDe, and other historical enemies of Peronism led 
many analysts to expect that the PJ would lose its working- and lower-class base in the 
1990s. This did not happen, however. Although many traditional Peronist voters did 
indeed oppose the Menem program,
64 the PJ retained the massive support of the poor 
(Ostiguy 1998).  
  The PJ’s continued lower-class support was not simply a product of a lack of 
electoral alternatives. Several left-of-center PJ defectors competed for Peronist votes in 
1991, including popular union leader Saúl Ubaldini (who ran for governor of Buenos 
Aires province) and a group of eight PJ congressmen, known as the “Group of Eight,” 
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policies. Moreover, the UCR and left-of-center parties such as the PI and the Unidad 
Socialista (the Socialist Unity alliance, or US) opposed the neoliberal model in the early 
1990s. Indeed, Radical leader Raúl Alfonsín created the umbrella Movimiento para la 
Democracia Social (Movement for Social Democracy, or MODESO) in 1992 in an 
explicit attempt to win working-class votes. Yet all of these efforts failed to capture 
working- and lower-class votes. Despite presenting themselves as “true Peronist” 
alternatives, Ubaldini and, to a lesser extent, the Group of Eight each received barely two 
percent of the vote in Buenos Aires; and the UCR, PI, and US all failed to expand beyond 
their traditional middle-class bases. 
 
The Menemist Electoral and Political Coalition 
Much research has been expended on the reasons for the political success of policy 
switches and neoliberal economic reforms of the type carried out by the Menem 
administration in Argentina. These reasons cover a spectrum that ranges from a “strong 
state” argument about technocratic insulation (e.g., Haggard and Kaufman 1992:18–37 
and 332–350, and 1995:154–59); to the capabilities and effectiveness of a policy 
network
65 within the state and the governing coalition (Teichman 2001:15–22), combined 
with the adaptability of the Peronist party organization and its shift toward clientelistic 
practices (Levitsky 1998b, 2005); to a bifurcated base of social support pitting a 
conservative hinterland against an urban working class (Gibson 1997); to actual bargains 
made with the losers of the reforms (Etchemendy 2001; Murillo 2001 on Argentina after 
1992); to the view that the problem is largely a false one, since representation is 
retrospective in Latin America (Stokes 1999:100) and voters very much liked 
neoliberalism once it was put into practice (Stokes 2001:138–42). These different 
explanations, moreover, have been bound up with a range of widely divergent political 
assumptions about the political cost of those neoliberal reforms, and therefore the levels 
of opposition that they are bound to awake. Some have assumed that major obstacles 
must be dealt with by a civilian administration in order to successfully carry out 
unpopular reforms, especially if they attack the social basis of the governing coalition 
(e.g., Waterbury 1989; Collier 1992: 136–41 and 156–61; Teichman 2001: 5–9; Murillo 
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typical collective action problem, where the winners of neoliberal policies are diffuse and 
the gains are long-term, while the losers are concentrated rent-seekers and their losses are 
short-term (e.g., Bates 1992; Krueger 1993). Others, finally, assume that there are few 
real obstacles apart from the need of politicians to dissimulate while seeking election 
(Stokes 1999:104–08), or to realize cognitively, once in power, that “efficiency policies” 
are best for the people (Stokes 2001:21 and 1999:126–27). 
  If one takes the perspective that neoliberal reforms carried out by elected 
governments, and especially by a labor-based party, do face major obstacles to political 
success, one can identify three general sources of political opposition that would need to 
be surmounted: rent-seeking oligopolies benefitting from state protection and subsidies; 
organized labor; and the electorate, especially if the segments affected belong to the 
traditional basis of the party carrying out the reforms. Concerning the first, Schamis 
(1999) has provided an empirically convincing analysis of why the top businesses that in 
the 1980s formed in Argentina the group known as the Captains of Industry (Ostiguy 
1990) actually stood to gain much from the neoliberal privatization program, despite the 
fact that a significant portion of those Captains of Industry had been among the main 
beneficiaries of the patria contratista (the ironically termed “contracting motherland”) as 
rent-seeking oligopolies. Etchemendy (2001), while recognizing the autonomy of the 
state’s initiative, extends this analysis in a rich empirical way to the tradable sector of the 
economy and, most importantly, to organized labor. The paradox for me lies at the 
electoral level.  
  The object of my contribution is thus specific and regards the issue of electoral 
political support. A major problem with the use of the social scientific term “coalition,” 
however, is that it is not clear what are the units forming a “coalition”—economic 
interests, defined from a political-economy logic; organizations, such as trade unions; 
sets of individuals, who are part of policy networks; regions, such as the hinterland; 
social groups, such as classes or class fractions; types of voters? Each answer is quite 
acceptable, but the various ways of identifying and characterizing coalitions are not 
interchangeable and involve very different research methodologies. However, rather than 
engaging in a debate about which unit of analysis is the most relevant or “best,” one can 
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approaches to analyzing “coalitions” as complementary to one another. In contrast to the 
organizational approach which lends itself very well, epistemologically, to a coalitional 
framework, in the case of voters, one can only speak metaphorically of “coalitions,” since 
what is being combined in reality are either appeals—and sets of people responding to a 
given appeal—or, less convincingly, whole sociologically defined groups of voters.
66 
  How electoral political support for the PJ’s neoliberal reforms is maintained 
becomes an especially puzzling question considering that, inverting the classic political 
economy statements mentioned above, Menem’s reforms arguably had specific and short-
term winners (e.g., the captains of industry), and diffuse but real losers—especially his 
own voters. The electoral sociological paradox stated in the previous section is thus in 
sharp need of explanation. Certainly, machine politics, as richly described by Levitsky 
(2003, 2001a, 2001b), did play an important material role, as it increasingly supplanted 
trade unions as the main conveyor belt between Peronist leaderships and the Peronist 
electorate. Without machine politics, even strongly held identities and political 
preferences among the popular sectors may disappear.
67 Still, unemployment and 
underemployment, which struck mainly among the traditional Peronist base, steadily rose 
to unprecedentedly high levels, from 13.9% in 1991 to 30.9% in May 1995,
68 as a 
product of the reforms. Peronism, however, remained entirely unchallenged throughout 
the decade within the social sectors most affected by this scourge. Similarly, survey 
analysis and my own interviews in the field show that a large majority of the lower- 
sector Peronist electoral base did not like those economic reforms, and that it is among 
that group that one finds the most negative attitude toward the new economic 
orientation.
69 If one differentiates by party identity, rather than socioeconomic level, 58% 
of Peronists preferred the state to be the main regulator of economic activity—the highest 
percentage by far of the three main families of party sympathizers—and only 39% 
preferred free enterprise (Equas 31)
70. In contrast, 55% of Radicals preferred free 
enterprise and, of course, 75% of UCeDeistas did so. Peronists were thus the least 
supportive of the new economic orientation. The vast majority, however, did repeatedly 
vote for the PJ. Inversely, the middle sectors, where so many of the buyers through newly 
possible and widespread credit cards and cuota systems (payment plans) could be found, 
and where approval rates for the measures were much higher,
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for the leader who had made all those purchases possible. One must thus be very cautious 
using highly aggregated data linking attitudes toward the economic model and voting 
preferences, as the conclusions are subject to a severe ecological fallacy: though there 
seems to be a correlation over time, most lower-sector Peronists did not like the 
economic policies but voted for the PJ; middle- and upper-middle sectors were much 
more favorable to the new economic orientation but voted for the PJ to a significantly 
lesser degree than the popular sectors.
72 My field interviews in the lower-sector areas of 
the greater Buenos Aires aimed to elucidate the first of these two mirror “contradictions” 
(Ostiguy 1998: ch. 6). 
  In Argentina, social-cultural identities (which include significant expressive and 
normative components) are very important in the “economy of likes and dislikes.” 
Moreover, especially within the popular sectors, political identities, and most 
conspicuously Peronist identity, are a major phenomenon.
73 This finding may perhaps 
seem somewhat banal to scholars of political behavior, but it is surprising how little 
attention it has received in comparative politics, including in discussions of economic 
reforms, where the influence of political identities on voting tend to be dismissed as 
“irrational.”
74 Murillo (2001: 149–52 and 166–72), of course, has emphasized the 
importance of party loyalty in Argentina in shaping the reaction of trade union leaders to 
economic reforms that they did not necessarily approve or want. But in contrast to party 
identities in the US, which have one of the two main parties as their object, the Peronist 
identity in Argentina refers not only, and perhaps not even mainly, to the Peronist party. 
Peronism is a collective social and political identity. The notion of movimiento need not 
be understood only in organizational terms—i.e., in reference to the political party, the 
trade unions, the guerrilla groups, the leader—but rather, more significantly and in a 
fashion closer to that of “social” movement, as a collective, socially differentiated 
identity oriented toward political, public action. With regard to Peronist identity, the best 
heuristic analogy is perhaps that of being Catholic: one may not like the current Pope or 
his policies, but that is not a reason to become Protestant. The logical outcome, in both 
instances, is of course abstention and disaffection, not “switching.” 
  This disjuncture between the way people voted and what they thought regarding 
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calculation, but rather largely of a strong sociocultural and political identity (see Figure 
7).
75 Thus, the key to Menem’s electoral support among the poor was his capacity to 
remain “Peronist.” Because Peronism is, first and foremost, a movement on the low, this 
meant sustaining a low appeal. My analysis therefore takes the party system and societal 
cleavages as a fundamental intervening variable within the Argentine polity between 
preferences, for example on economic policies, and voting. This observation is in line 
with a society where, as we have seen in this paper, a political divide between Peronism 
and non–Peronism, and more broadly between high and low, is deeply anchored, carries 
much historical baggage, and has an emotional charge.
76 
 
  There is little question that, prior to 1989, Menem effectively embodied a 
discourse and practices that were social-culturally very low. His political style, manners, 
and ways of addressing and relating to “the people” (el pueblo) were “pure Peronism.” 
He further developed this style by visiting people in their own low-income 
neighborhoods with his “caravans of hope” and later standing on top of the Menemobil, 
blessing objects given to him by poor people, and making gestures such as hugging his 
heart. His culturally popular and messianic image had a strong resonance among the 
poor; along the way, it also engendered popular trust in the persona of “Carlitos,” as well 
as a corresponding distrust among the middle class. 
  Although Menem abandoned his—admittedly vague and often contradictory—
populist socioeconomic discourse after taking office in 1989, he did not abandon his 
comparatively low sociocultural discourse and demeanor (though certain changes did 
happen in this regard). Although he replaced the poncho with expensive suits,
77 Menem 
continued to use a language and demeanor recognizable to all Peronists. The Menem-led 
PJ remained—much more so than the Renovadores in the late 1980s—solidly within the 
Peronist “political culture” in terms of its language, its mode of doing politics, its 
manners and its set of affective symbols. More generally, Menem’s appeal on the low, 
through publicized sociocultural practices (such as playing soccer with “the boys” on 
television or having manifest “success” with beautiful women) or socioculturally marked 
political practices
78 were in line with the very culture of Peronism, and continued to feed 
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well-educated Argentines and led them consider Menem an “embarrassment” (speeding 
down public highways in his new sports car, with police support; inviting super models 
and other starlets to the presidential palace) were attractive to many (particularly male) 
working- and lower-class voters.
  
  Menem also took pains to frame his government project—socioculturally and 
rhetorically—as distinctively Peronist. For example, in a famous speech to a 1991 party 
congress in which he explained the neoliberal transformation to his (statist, class-
conscious, and nationalist) Peronist followers, Menem declared: 
I come to this historic encounter of Justicialist militancy with a profound faith... 
The National Justicialist Movement was born to change history, not to endure it. 
[Argentina will] change through our courage, our braveness. Because to liberate 
our country from backwardness is not a matter of becoming less Peronist, but of 
becoming more Peronist.... 
  I come here with no intention of speaking in worn-out words or using big 
words. Or to display theories that have no heart or reason. Argentina is sick of 
words. Argentina won’t be fixed by talk....And like the Perón of 1945, we have no 
use for dogmatism, for preconceived models, or for ideologies....Today more than 
ever we must be the anti-system. We need to enter an era of daring transgressions, 
of truly revolutionary political practices... Is what I’m saying new, or didn’t the 
General Perón express himself this way?  
  I believe in neither privatization nor statism. I believe in Argentinism. In 
Argentinism with capital letters. I want to listen to the voice of the people, and 
this is why I listen to it, because the voice of the people is the voice of God. With 
the people, with God, and with our fatherland, to triumph, to triumph, to triumph! 
(1991)  
 
  This speech was not about markets or economic policies, but about Peronism and 
about being credibly on the low politically, including in vocabulary. In sum, if the 
Menem-led PJ appealed to the socioeconomic right, it never abandoned the low space 
that Peronism had occupied since the 1940s. Given that high-low differences remain the 
predominant axis in politics, one could say that in a very important sense, Menem 
remained solidly “Peronist.”
79  
  The fact that the PJ remained solidly on the low had important electoral 
consequences, for it meant that high parties would have difficulty capturing traditional 
Peronist votes via socioeconomic appeals. Thus, Alfonsín’s Movement for Social 
Democracy (MODESO), which made an explicitly socioeconomic appeal to the working 
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center parties such as the PI and the US. The salience of the high-low cleavage also helps 
to explain the failure of the Group of Eight, which, though Peronist (on the very-
moderate low), was largely a group of middle-class intellectuals associated with the 
magazine Unidos. Though lower than the UCR and the US, the Group of Eight was 
nevertheless unable to combine its left-of-center socioeconomic message with a credible 
appeal on the low. The only political force that made inroads among poor voters was 
MODIN,
80 which positioned itself on the extreme low. Founded in 1990 by Carapintada 
leader Aldo Rico, MODIN was nationalist, nativist, and socioculturally low, as well as 
anti-neoliberal. Rico cultivated an image as a strong male leader, at ease with guns, and 
he demarcated himself in public for being crude, “macho,” and at times violent (such as 
when he threw a rival out of a local party headquarters at gunpoint). Not surprisingly, 
MODIN aligned with the PJ beginning in 1995.  
  The key to Menem’s political success, then, was his combination of dissimilar 
appeals on the low and on the socioeconomic right (see Figure 7). He achieved this by 
combining the popular appeal of Peronism as a historically popular and socio-culturally 
low identity with the economic policies long demanded by an important sector of the 
economic elite and the neoliberal right.
81 The dualistic nature of this coalition was 
reflected graphically in the large “Rally of the Yes,” on April 1990, which is described by 
Cerruti (1993:331): 
Early, on time, without organization or supervision, they arrived convoked by the 
journalists. Entire upper-class families, liberal youth, students of private 
universities, members of the most renowned clubs of Buenos Aires, businessmen, 
bankers, ladies of high society. Dressed in the latest fashions, jewels, [and] hats, 
many left the car parked a few blocks away from the Plaza. Late, as always, and 
as if it was a human flood, the Peronists that were arriving from the Greater 
Buenos Aires convoked by [Peronist unionist] Luis Barrionuevo came down from 
the chartered buses. Each group occupied half of the Plaza. They did not talk to 
each other, they did not chant, they looked at each other with mistrust. 
 
  Survey and electoral data demonstrate the socially bifurcated nature of the 
Menemist political coalition, especially in Capital. Historically, the PJ vote has always 
varied inversely with income and education levels. Contrary to what several scholars 
have asserted, this did not change substantially under Menem, except in 1992–93 and 
only in Capital, when a “U-shaped” type of support occurred (Ostiguy 1998: 357–369). 48   Ostiguy 
 
What did change, therefore, was that the PJ—temporarily—incorporated a significant 
fraction of the upper-sector vote. Between 1990 and 1994, the overall slope was 
accordingly less steep than in the past.
82 But throughout the 1990s, support for the PJ was 
as always strongest among the poorest and least educated voters (Ostiguy 1998). The 
upper-sector voters, who migrated from the UCeDe and some conservative provincial 
parties, were essentially high-right and privileged the economic right’s effective reforms 
over the “propriety” and “decency” of the high.
83 In this sense and temporarily, 
Menemism electorally straddled, in a creative way, the high-low cleavage. To be sure, 
supporting Harvard-trained economist Domingo Cavallo, the government’s economic 
policy and “Menemism” despite Peronism, is not the same thing as supporting Peronism, 
“our political movement”, the party of Perón and Evita, despite a lack of enthusiasm for 
the new economic and foreign orientation.
84  Two important caveats should thus be noted 
about high-right support for Menem.
85 First, it was only of significant electoral 
consequence in wealthy urban centers, such as the Federal Capital. In the poorer districts 
of Greater Buenos Aires and peripheral provinces such as Jujuy and Salta, the upper-
sector vote never constituted an important part of the PJ’s electoral base. Second, the 
high-right/low coalition was short-lived. After 1995, most upper-sector voters defected to 
high parties such as the Alliance and Domingo Cavallo’s Acción por la República, or 
Action for the Republic. In the second half of the 1990s, Domingo Cavallo, until then 
largely a technocrat of the type described by O’Donnell (1973) and associated with the 
economic right and the US, launched himself in electoral politics, mainly in Capital and 
as the architect of the neoliberal reforms, taking up the space—with his successive 
political parties—previously occupied by the now defunct UCeDe.
86 
 
The Anti-Peronist Electoral and Political Coalition Reshaped 
Paradoxically, it was the anti-Peronist bloc, rather than the Peronist bloc, that was most 
dramatically transformed during the 1990s as a product of the neoliberal reforms and 
Menemism. The crisis of the UCR following 1989 and the party’s 1994 decision to make 
a pact with Menem to reform the constitution weakened the institutional hold of the UCR 
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FREPASO competed for that space—a challenge that threatened to reduce the century-
old UCR to political insignificance. 
  This outcome was indeed highly paradoxical: the nucleus of the FREPASO was a 
left-of-center group that split off from Peronism in 1991, the Group of Eight. Under the 
leadership of Peronist deputy and Unidos editor “Chacho” Álvarez, the Group of Eight 
left the Peronist block in opposition to Menem’s absolution of the convicted Generals of 
the dictatorship and to his sharp neoliberal turn. Instead of the traditional high-low 
division of Argentine politics, a left-right reorganization of the political field and party 
system thus became a real historical possibility. As a product of a careful construction of 
a series of political alliances with other forces, the Group of Eight gave way in 1993 to 
the Frente Grande (Broad Front, or FG). Had the Frente Grande consolidated itself in a 
position left of the center (on the left-right axis), but in the center or on the moderate-low 
of the high-low divide, it might have produced clear a realignment of Argentine politics, 
making the left-right division the primary political divide. 
  Yet despite its left-of-center Peronist origins, the Frente Grande, which was to 
give birth to the FREPASO at the end of 1994, neither “normalized” the party system 
along left-right lines (Abal Medina 1995) nor bridged the high-low divide. The history of 
this serious attempt to constitute a “transversal” alliance to transform the party system, 
although somewhat tortuous, ended up conforming and confirming a very clear pattern. 
The first move in this sequence was by the more moderate Peronist deputies of the Group 
of Eight, led by “Chacho” Álvarez, who crossed the high-low divide and joined forces 
with “Democracia Popular,” or “Popular Democracy,” a short-lived group that united 
members of the human rights movement, such as Graciela Fernandez Meijide and Aníbal 
Ibarra (both from Capital), and the fraction of the Christian Democracy also linked with 
human rights, led by Carlos Auyero (see Appendix). Together, they created the Frente 
por la Democracia y la Justicia Social (Front for Democracy and Social Justice, or 
FREDEJUSO). Sectors of the PI, located on the moderate-high and left-of-center, also 
joined it. Contrary to the expectations of its members, the FREDEJUSO performed very 
badly in the first national election that followed Menem’s turn-around, in 1991. This 
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appeal, which they had in that election, combined with a left-of-center (and high-of-
center) appeal.  
  For the 1992 election for senator in Capital, a different, this time more leftist, 
“transversal” alliance performed better, reaping 7.8% of the votes. This Front of the 
South was led by a movie director involved in the Peronist left during the 1970s, “Pino” 
Solanas, in alliance with the Communist Party and the more leftist Peronist deputies of 
the Group of Eight (Appendix). The Front of the South received the support of the 
FREDEJUSO.  
  In May 1993, these two “transversal” forces and their respective leaders, 
“Chacho” Álvarez and “Pino” Solanas, created the Frente Grande, left of center. A very 
specific location within the double political spectrum had thus been unified and occupied 
institutionally: the Communist Party, the PI, human rights militants, and left-, as well as 
left-of-center, Peronists on the moderate-low (see Figure 6 for the spatial location of 
these specific forces; see Appendix for the institutional construction in that space). In 
theory, the Frente Grande combined a leftist and a “true Peronist” opposition to 
Menemism and its “economic and social model.” That united institutional space 
performed very well electorally in Capital in the October 1993 national elections for 
deputy, achieving 13.7% of the vote and transforming itself in the third political force of 
Capital, ahead of Socialist Unity. In more ways than one, the Frente Grande now 
occupied, both in terms of political position and electoral pull, the space of the PI in the 
1980s (Figure 6). It also received its electoral support mainly among the middle sectors. 
After 1992, Álvarez, Auyero, and Meijide increasingly “centered their critiques on the 
subordination of Congress by the Executive, the efforts to reform the constitution simply 
to allow Menem’s reelection, and the degradation of political life by corruption” (Novaro 
and Palermo 1998:92). “Chacho” Álvarez stated publicly that he was not Peronist 
anymore and that his purpose was not to build a new Peronist Renovation.  
  In November 1993, the Radicales, under Alfonsín, signed the Olivos Pact with 
Menem’s PJ, in order to reform the constitution under specific terms.
87 Elections for a 
Constituent Assembly were thus scheduled for April 1994. In this setting, the Frente 
Grande constituted itself as the main opposition to Menem’s PJ, the UCR having its 
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the high, having established a clean break with the Peronist tradition; it also started to 
moderate its leftist opposition to the economic model. The FG thus clearly shifted its 
attack on Menemism from socioeconomic to ethical grounds. The FG appeal centered 
mostly on corruption, as seen in the party’s campaign slogan: “Constitution without 
Mafias.” The Frente Grande’s appeal was based on republicanism and political 
liberalism, that is, respect for the division of powers, judicial independence, and clean 
government. It also included public education. These were issues of serious concern to 
the (typically high) middle and upper-middle classes, but which—according to surveys—
were of less interest to the poor (who were and are concerned about concretely “getting 
things done” and favor politicians they feel close to and can see in person). Even the FG’s 
socioeconomic discourse involved increasingly moral appeals, rather than hailing the 
poor themselves. FG leaders referred to the poor in the third person—in sharp contrast to 
Peronist first-person-plural hailings—or as a symptom of the unhealthy situation created 
by neoliberalism. Figure 7 illustrates how the FREPASO “coalition” was based on the 
combination of a high sociocultural appeal (ethics, civic republicanism, institutional 
integrity) and—albeit decreasingly—a left-of-center socioeconomic appeal. The electoral 
result was impressive. The FG became the first electoral force in Capital, with 38% of the 
vote, and, most importantly, established itself as a national force, with 12.7% of the 
votes. Its strength, however, was still very unevenly distributed nationally, as it was 
completely absent, for example, in the poorer and less developed Northwest (see Figure 
7). 
  The year 1994 saw a major transformation in the Argentine party system. The 
Frente Grande became established solidly on the high, originally on a left-of-center 
position (1993). From there, however, it gradually but very clearly shifted toward the 
center of the left-right spectrum, increasingly squeezing the UCR out of the position it 
had historically occupied. Economic stability and privatizations had now also been 
incorporated in its repertoire. The clear movement of the FG away from the left alienated 
Solanas and the forces that had constituted the Front of the South, in the process. With 
the gap widening with rising Álvarez, Solanas left the FG to form the more leftist 
Alliance of the South, reoccupying the political space that had been left empty by the 
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came to characterize the Frente Grande  as favoring a “clean version” of the economic 
model and as concerned mainly with “ethical” issues. Novaro and Palermo (1998) 
accurately describes the Frente Grande’s (and later the FREPASO’s) discourse and 
political appeals as mainly centered around “republican values,” an Argentine replica of 
the French discourse of the same name, generally used against right-wing populist 
demagogues. The family of issues threaded together under that rubric is: respect for the 
institutional mediations and checks and balances of the Republic (what O’Donnell calls 
“horizontal accountability”), prevention of abuse of power; the rule of law and equality in 
front of the law, without impunity; transparency of governmental actions; civic rights and 
the fostering of a civic morality; political pluralism and public discussions of issues; i.e., 
overall and in brief, a defense of the institutions of the Republic and their independence, 
against personalism (see Novaro and Palermo 1998: 91, 96, 122, 127, 134) Needless to 
say, this republican discourse is clearly on the high, in the political-cultural 
subdimension. Added to this, the most important leading figures of the FG, such as 
Graciela Fernández Meijide and Aníbal Ibarra, were also distinctly high in their manners 
and political styles. The success of the FG within the more educated segments of the 
urban middle class was thus immense, having now also taken over the space occupied a 
decade before, around 1983, by Alfonsinism. 
88 
  Under the leadership of Álvarez, this oppositional FG continued in 1994 its 
process of institutional expansion and unification. In August 1994, in another—this time 
more centrist—effort at effecting a “transversal” rupture of the party system, a highly 
mediatized meeting took place at the Café Molinos between Álvarez (FG), Federico 
Storani (or the progressive, moderate-low faction of the UCR –Figure 6), and Octavio 
Bordón, the Peronist governor and then senator for Mendoza, located on the very-
moderate low, on the center of the left-right spectrum. By the end of the year, Storani had 
decided to remain in the UCR, challenging the official candidate of the UCR for the 
presidential nomination. However, a major institutional development was the defection of 
Bordón from the PJ, forming a group called Política Abierta para la Integridad Social 
(Open Policy for Social Integrity, or more significantly PAIS, or “country”). In 
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Grande, Bordón’s PAIS, and the one remaining significant force on the (very-) high-left, 
the Socialist Unity (Figures 6 and 8; Appendix).  
  An open primary quickly took place between Álvarez (on the high, still somewhat 
left of center) and Bordón, in a centrist position in both dimensions. Contrary to 
expectations and to what an institutional perspective would have led us to predict,
89 
Bordón won those primaries and therefore became the presidential candidate of the 
FREPASO, which had now taken over the Frente Grande. The victory of Bordón over 
Álvarez in the February 1995 presidential primaries completed this shift away from the 
left. By the 1995 presidential election, the FREPASO had thus completely dropped its 
opposition to the core elements of the neoliberal model (including privatization, trade 
liberalization, and the Convertibility Plan) and focused almost all of its attention on 
public mores, clean and ethical government, civil liberties, respect for republican 
institutions and the division of power: it was now an ex-radical civic union. Bordón, 
Menem’s main political adversary in the race, obtained 29.2% of the votes, well before 
the UCR’s candidate, Horacio Massaccesi, who came a distant third with 17% of the 
vote. In the vote for deputies, which is less centered on personalities, the UCR and the 
FREPASO were neck to neck at the national level, with each around 21% of the vote. 
  Figure 8 summarizes the above discussion by presenting the Argentine political 
map in a dynamic fashion for the early to mid-1990s. It shows the evolution of what 
became the FREPASO from the Peronist center-left (Group of Eight) in 1990, to the high 
center-left (FG) in 1993; and then, along the high, toward the center on the left-right axis 
(FREPASO) in 1994–95.  
  The high center-left, high center strategy was thus enormously successful. The 
FG/FREPASO increased its vote share from four percent in 1993 to 30 percent in the 
1995 presidential election, and it became the dominant political force in Federal Capital. 
This success was clearly made possible by the party’s high-center appeal. The party’s 
vote was concentrated in wealthy urban centers, particularly Federal Capital. It is well 
known that the capital is socioculturally distinct from much of the rest of the country. It 
has significantly higher levels of wealth and education, less caudillismo, and a more 
cosmopolitan orientation. Indeed, Capital has often been accused of being 
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toward the (more “folksy”) rest of the country. Moreover, survey and electoral data show 
that the FG/FREPASO performed best in middle- and upper-middle-class neighborhoods 
(and worst in the slums), and that support for the party was particularly high among those 
with the highest level of education.
90 This means that in socioeconomic and educational 
terms, FREPASO’s electoral base was very similar to the high-center UCR (e.g., 
Alfonsinism). Rather than crosscutting the high-low divide, then, FREPASO ended up 
reinforcing it.  
  Figure 8 also shows the very-low position of MODIN, which did successfully 
capture traditional Peronist votes, in contrast to the US or the FG, which did not. Despite 
Menem’s clear positioning on the right, the PJ remained quite heterogeneous. It included 
Ubaldini on the low center-left,
91 old guard union leader Lorenzo Miguel and Buenos 
Aires governor Eduardo Duhalde in the low center, and newer leaders such as Alberto 
Pierri and Santa Fe governor Carlos Reutemann on the center-right.  
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BACK TO THE PAST: 
THE PARTY SYSTEM IN THE LATE 1990s 
 
If the high-low cleavage had shown some signs of breaking down in the early 1990s, by 
the end of the decade it had reasserted itself with full vigor. In October 1995, Meijide was 
elected senator for Capital with a strong 46% of the vote. Elections were then scheduled 
in Capital for June 1996 to elect the Capital’s intendant, or chief of covernment.
92 Bordón 
wanted to nibble at the Peronist coalition by having Gustavo Beliz, a Peronist clearly 
right of center but on the very-moderate low (Figure 8), run for the FREPASO. The 
FREPASO, however, had previously agreed internally to have the socialist La Porta, 
clearly left of center and very-high, run for this office. The euclidian political distance 
between the two potential candidates was thus very large. Not surprisingly, severe 
tensions arose. The militants of the Frente Grande and the Socialist Unity in the 
FREPASO clearly sided with La Porta, with the backing of Meijide, also on the high 
center-left. Bordón thus became isolated within the FREPASO, and slammed the door, 
never to come back.
93 Bordón had been correct, however: La Porta, on the very-high left, 
was positioned too far from the center of even Capital’s political space. La Porta lost the 
Capital’s election to the eternal rival of Alfonsín within the UCR, the also very-high but 
center/center-right Radical de la Rúa. It was the first positive political news, and 
comeback, for the UCR in the 1990s.  
  The sharp lesson from the 1995 presidential election was that a divided 
opposition—the UCR and the FREPASO—was the best way to ensure the continuity of 
the PJ in power. In contrast to Mexico, where the Partido Acción Nacional (National 
Action Party, or PAN) and the Partido de la Revolución Democrática (Party of the 
Democratic Revolution, or PRD) stood quite far apart on the left-right axis, arguably one 
on either side of the PRI, the FREPASO and the UCR, as we have seen, were occupying 
almost the same political space in 1996 (Figure 9)—or at least, significantly overlapped. 
For the 1997 national elections for deputies, the UCR and FREPASO did the only 
rational thing: they joined their organizations and ran together under the banner of the 
Alianza. The effort paid off: for the first time since 1989, Menem’s PJ lost the elections. 
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  As in 1995, when Bordón and Álvarez joined forces, an open primary was 
necessary to decide from which of these two now major political parties, the UCR and the 
FREPASO, the leader of the Alianza, and therefore Argentina’s likely next president, 
would come. The primaries were set for November 1998: the FREPASO backed Graciela 
Meijide, and the UCR, Fernando de la Rúa. Both candidates were very much on the high, 
but Meijide still had a left-of-center image, while de la Rúa was clearly right of center. 
Actually, while the key figure of Alfonsín was inside the area of political overlap 
between the UCR and FREPASO, de la Rúa was outside of it, on the right (Figures 8 and 
9). With 64% of the vote, the Radical de la Rúa won an overwhelming victory over the 
Frepasista Meijide. As in 1995, a candidate of the high center-left had difficulty imposing 
herself in an open primary as the presidential candidate. While many had been 
forecasting the disappearance of the UCR at the hands of the FREPASO in a struggle for 
the same “share” of political space, the UCR was now back in strength, as the senior 
partner of the coalition most likely to win the presidency. Paradoxically, the FREPASO, 
which had begun left of center as the FG (and even as left-of-center Peronists) and had 
been in clear opposition to the right represented by Menemism, was now the junior 
partner of a coalition supporting a high-right presidential candidate! 
  In the meantime, a deadly struggle for the PJ presidential candidacy developed 
between Menem and Duhalde. Legally, Menem was barred by the Constitution he 
himself had negotiated from running for a third consecutive presidential term. As a 
leading candidate on the low, however, such “legal niceties” were not a major 
impediment for Menem (as they certainly were not at the time for Fujimori in Peru). For 
the PJ, the major party on the low, primaries, which must be accompanied by 
proceduralism and the rule of law, are only one political option among many for settling 
political differences. Much as had occurred in the 1970s, but without the violence, severe 
political infighting took place within Peronism to settle the issue. Politically, Duhalde 
was more of a centrist and “classical” Peronist, thus spatially to the left of right-wing 
Menem. After much difficulty and very late in the game, Duhalde, weakened by the 
internal conflict, became the PJ’s presidential candidate. The PJ was thus led by a centrist 
politician on the low. 
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  A highly paradoxical situation therefore developed for the 1999 presidential 
elections. While high-low differences were now particularly wide, de la Rúa’s 
socioeconomic platform now placed him somewhat to the right of the Peronist Duhalde, 
who had emerged as a critic of the neoliberal model (Figure 9). But overall, the Alliance 
and PJ differed little on socioeconomic issues. The left-right partisan differences, which 
were real in the early 1990s and had created a diagonal, high-left versus low-right, axis 
of political conflict, had again largely disappeared in the 1999 presidential elections.  
  However, a very wide gap—not unlike that between Menem and Angeloz ten 
years earlier in 1989—separated Duhalde and de la Rúa on the high-low axis. Duhalde 
had risen within Peronism through his success in the impoverished second belt of the 
Greater Buenos Aires, where particularly rough political methods prevail, physical 
intimidation is common, and where he had built a strong political machine (see Levitsky 
2003). Duhalde had the image of a plain “man of the people,” at ease culturally with 
workers and poor people. De la Rúa, a man of Capital, was very restrained and proper in 
his demeanor, thought of himself as “boring” (in contrast to Menem), believed in the 
legitimacy of the law, and had the image of an “effete,” on the very high.  
  All major parties differentiated themselves in the 1999 presidential elections 
primarily along the high-low divide in politics. The Alliance and Cavallo’s Action for the 
Republic adopted classically high profiles. Alliance campaign posters called “For a 
serious country: Enough of Menem,” while Cavallo’s quoted Sarmiento. The Alliance 
promised an “ethical shock,” and Alliance vice presidential candidate Chacho Álvarez 
declared that the Alliance sought to “adopt the institutional norms of the First World.”
94 
Duhalde, by contrast, maintained a profile much more on the low, aligning with the ultra-
low Aldo Rico and campaigning against portenos
95 who “treat us like Indians.”
96 
  Because of its composition, the new Alliance coalition thus became a broad left-
right coalition of the high. Peronist politicians were therefore quick to compare the 
Alliance to the Democratic Union of 1946 (see the inside part of the circle in Figure 4). 
Much like the Democratic Union, the Alliance included left-of-center social-democrats 
(such as the Socialists and many FG militants), centrist radicals, and conservative 
provincial parties. And what united these political forces, as in 1946, was a 
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norms, civic public life, the Republic), and a predominantly middle- and upper-middle-
class base. On the low, Peronism continued to have significant left-right differences, as 
well. 
  In sum, Argentine politics appears to have gone full circle during the 1990s. A 
Peronist left opposition to Menem gradually moved to the high left, and then to the high 
center. With the formation of the Alliance and the election of the high center-right de la 
Rúa, anti-Peronism again then shifted to the right of (post-Menemist) Peronism (Figure 
9). The situation was in many ways comparable to that depicted in Figure 6 (the 1980s), 
except that the center of gravity of the space had shifted somewhat to the right. The 
Alliance maintained roughly the same profile as the combination of the UCR, the PI, and 
the Socialists in the 1980s (Figure 6). Cavallo’s Action for the Republic replaced the 
UCeDe on the high right. The PJ remained heterogeneous, although its left wing, 
represented by politicians such as Santa Cruz governor Nestor Kirchner and unions such 
as the—lower—Movimiento de Trabajadores Argentinos (Argentine Workers Movement, 
or MTA), was weaker in 2001. Throughout the 1990s, the high-low dimension remained 
the main divide of political conflict. Not only that, but this divide remained, and remains, 
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POSTSCRIPT: ARGENTINA’S STRUCTURED POLITICAL 
SPACE IN THE 2000s 
 
1999–2002 
History of course does not stop, and since the first versions of this paper in 2000–02, the 
economy, under de la Rúa and his neoliberal economic ministers, melted down—strongly 
affecting the party system, but not the structured political space—but also recovered in 
the following years. A new cycle of efforts at transforming the party system, within a 
context of severe delegitimization of politicians, began in 2003. As yet another tribute to 
the robustness of the double political spectrum, the structure of the Argentine political 
space remains intact, despite what are otherwise earth-shattering phenomena and 
transformations. 
  Between 1991 and 2001, the “rotation” described above in the main axis of 
political conflict, not unlike the rotation described for the 1940s regarding both the high 
and the low, continued moving clockwise. President de la Rúa first chose a moderate 
economist (linked to Alfonsinism) as his minister of economy. He then replaced him with 
an ultra-orthodox neoliberal economist, also from the Radical party but obviously on its 
right: Ricardo López Murphy. López Murphy was a graduate in economics from 
Chicago, had advised Angeloz (Figure 6), and was a consultant for the powerful and 
conservative Fundación de Investigaciones Económicas Latinoamericanas (Foundation 
for Latin American Economic Research, or FIEL). With the economy driven more and 
more into recession under orthodox fiscal policies, de la Rúa then appointed as his 
minister of economy a figure outside of the Alliance and to its right: the “eternal” 
Domingo Cavallo! Cavallo, as is well known, had been Menem’s main minister of 
economy and the architect of the neoliberal reforms and economic stabilization. In the 
1999 presidential elections, Cavallo had run as the leader of the high right party he had 
just founded—Action for the Republic—receiving a total of 10% of the national vote. By 
2000, it seemed that whatever the political force in power, Cavallo always ended up 
minister of economy. Indeed, Cavallo has now been a top civil servant for the three main 
historical political actors of Argentina: the military under the B-A regime, in 1981; the 
Peronists, under Menem; and the Radicales, under de la Rúa. But like the UCeDe, he had, 62   Ostiguy 
 
of course, never been able to win a large fraction of the vote on his own or based on his—
very clear—programmatic position.  
  With the tandems de la Rúa-López Murphy and then de la Rúa-Cavallo standing 
for orthodox neoliberalism and big business, and with cases of corruption not being dealt 
with firmly by the president, a situation clearly similar to that of the early 1990s 
developed. And indeed, dissatisfaction predictably grew within the left of the Alliance. 
The emptied political space on the high left, created by the notable move of the 
Alliance’s leader to the right, was in due time in the 2000s filled by a new organizational 
actor, called Alternativa para una República de Iguales (Argentina for a Republic of 
Equals, or ARI). This new party was manned mainly by left-dissidents of the FREPASO, 
especially from the ex-Frente Grande and the Socialist Parties. Its leader, however, was a 
then little-known progressive radical, Elisa Carrió, who broke from the voting block of 
the Alianza in Congress on ethical and anti-corruption issues. She joined forces with the 
very-high-left socialist Alfredo Bravo. ARI was somewhat vague on economic programs 
(although it definitely claims to be “progressive”) and, like the FG in 1994, had its clear 
trademark in anti-corruption and ethical—”high”—issues. It was in fact a combination of 
the moderate-high and very-high center-left, just like in 1993–94 (Figure 10). 
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  The clockwise movement of the main axis of conflict, as expected, was not 
limited to the high but simultaneously occurred on the low (just as it had in the 1940s). 
After de la Rúa resigned at the end of 2001, power was transferred to Peronism, on the 
other side of the divide. And Peronism chose as the new president of the country Adolfo 
Rodríguez Saá. Rodríguez Saá, in contrast to his predecessors, adopted a nationalist, 
left—and to some, demagogical—discourse, and attempted to act as a strong man. One of 
his first measures was to have Argentina default on its large foreign debt (something 
Cavallo had attempted to avoid at absolutely all costs), which he did with nationalist 
pride. While Menem had led the PJ clearly from the right during the entire 1990s, the PJ 
now became led, even if briefly, from the nationalist left. Some skeptical Peronist 
deputies disparagingly compared Rodríguez Saá to Hugo Chávez. Argentine politics had 
therefore gone an entire, full circle from 1988–89, with Menem defeating Angeloz (on 
the high-right), to 2001, with Rodríguez Saá replacing de la Rúa (on the high-right). The 
high-low divide, however, had remained intact. An alliance between the forces of 
Rodríguez Saá and the ARI, both clearly left of center, was as unthinkable as, in 1945, an 
alliance between Perón’s Laborists and the Socialists. And indeed, Rodríguez Saá came 
to ally, instead, with Aldo Rico on the low. Needless to say, the ARI came to be very 
popular among the middle sectors, while Rodríguez Saá was then very popular among the 
popular sectors. 
  De la Rúa’s years in government were odd in many ways. He faced his most 
important political opposition from the left of his own Alliance. On the other hand, he 
received support from actors who were not part of his party or coalition: most clearly 
Cavallo, but also, behind the scenes, from Menem, on Peronism’s right. Writing an 
earlier version of this text in 2003, I predicted that no doubt analysts would then forecast 
for the current decade the creation of significant “transversal” alliances and the radical 
transformation of Argentina’s political space (basically along the left-right axis)—a 
change which occurred no more in this current decade than it did in the wake of similar 
developments in the early 1990s, in the late 1950s with Frondizismo or, with regard to 
high and low in politics, in the mid-1940s.  
  On the low and to the left of Peronism, a new political actor, called the Social 
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between the Social Pole and ARI, both left of center. ARI clearly stood for civic 
republicanism, a certain kind of protest, the struggle against corruption, as well as 
“progressivism,” whereas the Social Pole was concerned “in the first person” with the 
social plight of the poor, as was Ubaldini in the 1980s. Their electorates are 
correspondingly very different. 
  Like a decade before in the case of the Frente Grande, Elisa Carrió built bridges in 
2002 with leaders of the “pure left,” on the high of the divide, such as, this time, Luis 
Zamora, an ex-Trotskyite bookseller and human rights lawyer (instead of the Communist 
Party and Graciela Fernandez Meijide, as in 1992–93). As in the mid-1990s, there was 
also a certain overlap, politically, between the ARI and the progressive wing of the 
Radicales. Carrió herself was a Radical deputy from the Chaco, before the UCR joined 
the Alianza. Although the FREPASO and, one decade later, the ARI, both focus heavily 
on republican issues, they have also each been associated with a given tandem of public 
figures: the duo Bravo-Carrió took over the duo Álvarez-Meijide. 
  De la Rúa, as incapable of mastering the economy in times of crisis as was his 
Radical predecessor Alfonsín twelve years before, resigned at the end of December 2001, 
after a series of riots. After the short-lived Peronist presidency of Rodríguez Saá, 
Eduardo Duhalde, the loser of the 1999 presidential elections but nonetheless a central 
and weighty figure within Peronism, became president of Argentina. With de la Rúa 
eliminated, Alfonsín also again became the central figure of the UCR and, as he had done 
with Menem in 1994, gave Duhalde his political support, invoking the country’s stability 
(also reflecting his awareness of the UCR’s very weak electoral position).  
 
2002–2005
97 
Between December 2001 and early 2003, Argentina made world headlines with the 
collapse of the government of President Fernando de la Rúa, the rapid succession of three 
presidents,
98 the bankruptcy of the banking system and the state’s fiscal crisis, the 
widespread rejection of the political class with the slogan “Get Rid of Them All,” the 
waves of protest and the explosion of social movements, associations, and protest 
movements, distant from the state and critical not only of neoliberalism but of the 
monetized market economy as well. This crisis, the worst of which lasted about two 66   Ostiguy 
 
years, was however perhaps just as remarkable as the illusion of drastic change perceived 
by numerous analysts. Besides the immediacy of the banking and employment situation, 
there had been a strong disillusionment from many engendered by Menemist Peronism 
and, as significantly, by the failure of the long process of construction of an institutional 
opposition led by the FREPASO, which had resulted in the formation of the Alianza, in 
De la Rúa’s presidency, and finally in a resounding economic, political, and ethical 
collapse, thus exhausting all possible political alternatives within the party system. The 
logical result was the rejection of the political class altogether.  
In 2002 and 2003, however, in a context of weakened popularity of politicians 
and under the aegis of Peronist interim president Eduardo Duhalde and of his Minister of 
Economy Roberto Lavagna, the state’s coffers were replenished little by little, order was 
slowly reestablished, and the oppositional social movements were treated with a 
combination of repression and cooptation. One cannot overemphasize the abnormality of 
the urgent situation that had erupted under De la Rúa and that was then subsequently and 
slowly diffused during the interim presidency of Duhalde (himself a very pragmatic man, 
a sort of “Peronist puntero”
99 on a grand scale).  
  In a beautiful way in terms of this paper, as a hotly contested game was going on 
in late 2002 within Peronism to decide who was going to lead the PJ when Duhalde 
would come to the end of his interim presidency, every one of the four corners of the 
Peronist political space had a contending candidate: Kirchner was running on the high-
left of Peronism; de la Sota on the high-right of Peronism; Rodríguez Saá on the low-
”left”; and Menem was attempting a comeback, on the low-right (see also Figure 10 and, 
for 2003, Figure 11). The future leader of the PJ was unquestionably going to be 
Argentina’s next president.  
  Figure 11 illustrates the fortuitous or, rather, unplanned circumstances
100 that 
moved the entire Peronist movement leftward, with Kirchner. Duhalde, between 1998 
and 2004, was Peronism’s strong man—though he was himself not running in the 
upcoming elections. He was located approximately in the center of the Peronist political 
space. His first choice for the presidential candidacy was Governor Carlos Reutemann, a 
center-right Peronist. This ex-Formula One champion, who had become the Peronist 
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set his sights on Juan Manuel de la Sota, governor of Cordoba and also right of center. 
But de la Sota was too much on the high for Peronism and, on economic issues, not very 
different from Menem; his campaign in any case failed to take off. It was only as a third 
choice that Duhalde threw his weight behind Néstor Kirchner, governor of Santa Cruz, in 
the hopes of thwarting the inexhaustible ambitions of Carlos Menem. 
  To crown this analysis, surveys showed that Rodríguez Saá (on the low left-of-
center) and Menem (on the low right) both received greatest political support from the 
poorest and less educated lower-sector voters. Kirchner (on the moderate-low, left-of-
center) and de la Sota (on the center of the high-low divide, right-of-center) were more 
popular among middle social sectors. Congruent with this framework, Rodríguez Saá 
made an alliance with Aldo Rico, on the very-low, and Hugo Moyano, a teamster on the 
very-low center-left (Figure 10). Pierri (Figure 8), on the low right, fittingly gave his 
support to Menem. 
 
At first glance, the crisis of 2001–03 could be interpreted as having led to the 
fragmentation or implosion of the Argentine party system.
101 Witness the unheard-of fact 
that in the April 2003 presidential elections, five candidates, three of whom were 
Peronists, ran simultaneously, all independently of one another.
102 The Argentine party 
system has historically been characterized as bipartisan,
103 but in the 2003 elections the 
UCR candidate was not among the pack of five.
104 There were, moreover, not one but 
three Peronist candidates, Carlos Menem, Néstor Kirchner, and Adolfo Rodríguez Saá, 
all conducting ruthless presidential campaigns with autonomous organizations, with 
alliances between Peronist and non-Peronist candidates theoretically as possible as 
between Peronist candidates.  
  However—and fundamentally—the two-dimensional Argentine political space 
remained spectacularly unchanged. It even displayed a remarkable continuity, as was also 
the case before and after the military dictatorships of 1976–83 and 1966–73, and before 
and after the hyper-inflationary crisis of 1989 with Menem’s swerve to the right. In fact, 
if the Argentine bipartisan system has fragmented or imploded, it is within an especially 
stable two-dimensional political space. Positions in the two-dimensional Argentine 
political space are in fact far more stable than the partisan institutions themselves, which 68   Ostiguy 
 
come and go. A position that is abandoned within this two-dimensional space leads, after 
a few years, to the creation of a new partisan actor to fill that political void.
105   
  Figure 11 represents the position of the five main candidates in the April 2003 
presidential elections, with three Peronists (Rodríguez Saá, Menem, and Kirchner), and 
two non-Peronists (López Murphy and Carrió). Menem and Rodríguez Saá are the most 
on the low, with Menem clearly to the right of Rodríguez Saá. Carrió and López Murphy, 
both of Radical origin, are the most on the high. Carrió, moreover, also established her 
distinctive mark, like the FREPASO of 1994–95 before her, as being on the “high” on 
questions of ethics, transparency, and respect for the law. Carrió was then situated 
relatively to the left, having experienced her period of greatest growth while allied with 
the socialist Alfredo Bravo. As for Lopez Murphy, he sought to represent a serious and 
decent neoliberal right (corresponding to a certain image of developed countries), fully 
respecting the separation of powers, the smooth functioning of republican institutions, 
and the rule of law, in contrast to the shenanigans, extravagance, and populism of 
Menem. Kirchner was then the only presidential candidate to straddle the political 
cleavage between the high and low in Argentina—something that has definitely changed 
since. Although a Peronist, like his center-right Peronist colleague De la Sota, he was 
then arguably situated on the moderate high. From the moderate-high and the center-left, 
he was then in an excellent position to attract the progressive and urban middle-class 
republican vote, as he partially did in 2003 and especially in 2005. The competition that 
originally pitted the Peronist Kirchner against the non-Peronist Carrió in 2003 for this 
same educated, center-left, and middle-class electorate was unavoidable but short lived. 
  On the left-right axis, López Murphy and Menem clearly represented the right. 
López Murphy was perceived as a gorila
106 by the Peronists, while Menem was ever 
more linked to the popular conservatism of the country’s interior or hinterland. Kirchner 
and Carrió, meanwhile, were left of the center. The latter, far to the high, attracted then a 
non-Peronist progressive vote. As for Rodríguez Saá, he remained difficult to classify 
along the left-right axis in 2003; emphasizing the “national and popular,” he placed 
himself very low in the Peronist tradition.  
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  With this very high number of five viable presidential candidates, each attempting 
to differentiate himself as much as possible from the others, the center of the two-
dimensional political space remained notably vacant. Figure 11 allows us to visualize a 
circle formed by the five candidates at the outer perimeter of the two-dimensional space, 
with each one accenting his uniqueness.
107 Somewhat in the center of the Peronist space 
we find Duhalde, who indeed played the role of kingmaker in the presidential race among 
the Peronist candidates. This situation is thus the exact opposite of that in the 1980s, 
where the two principal political forces converged on the center of the two-dimensional 
space, under the leadership of the Peronist Cafiero and the Radical Alfonsín.  
  With these respective positions, illustrated in Figure 11, the logical possibilities of 
alliances in 2003 were numerous, particularly in prevision of a second round: a 
(neoliberal) right-wing alliance between López Murphy and Menem, against Kirchner, 
Carrió, and implicitly Rodriguez Saá; or an alliance of the low between Rodríguez Saá 
and Menem, against the non-Peronists. It is this latter alliance that became a reality, in 
May 2005, with the Frente Popular, even though Rodriguez Saá had clearly attacked 
Menem from the left in 2003. Menem and Saá even publicly accused Kirchner of not 
being Peronist, a charge that could not be taken lightly. Inversely, there existed the 
possibility of an alliance on the high between Carrió and López Murphy, which would 
have echoed the political experience of the Alianza, between “Chacho” Alvarez and De la 
Rúa from 1997 to 2000. 
In late 2002, somewhere shortly before the first round, some polls put Menem and 
López Murphy in the lead. According to other polls, Carrió and Rodriguez Saá were in 
the lead (Cheresky 2004a: 46-47). Either way, this would have occasioned a purely high-
low (and not left-right) second round, as in the 1999 presidential elections between 
Duhalde and De la Rúa. However, the 2003 finalists turned out to be Menem and 
Kirchner, in a second round that was in contrast entirely left-right, but within the Peronist 
movement. Carrió rallied to Kirchner, and Rodriguez Saá implicitly did the same despite 
a strong campaign of seduction undertaken by Menem, while López Murphy remained 
neutral (Figure 11).
108 
  The greater the euclidian spatial distance between two candidates or forces, the 
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Republic of Equals) and Menemism. One was also hard-pressed to imagine the Peronist 
left allying with López Murphy. On the high-right, there was then not enough room, 
despite their entirely different partisan origins, for López Murphy (Recrear), Domingo 
Cavallo with his ex-Acción por la República, and the defunct UCeDe. 
  For the legislative elections of October 2005, the major development was the 
rupture between Duhalde and his 2003 protégé, Kirchner.
109 Between 2003 and 2004, the 
latter had gradually consolidated power within Peronism and with the governors. 
Duhalde, on the other hand, had always sought to reign in Kirchner’s “leftist” leanings. In 
2005, Kirchner and Duhalde presented two separate and opposite tickets, and fought a 
bitter political battle vicariously through their wives, who were running against one 
another for senator in the important province of Buenos Aires. As expected, there was 
consequently neither a full rupture within Peronism nor a reconciliation, but rather a 
power relationship that reflected the electoral results of October.  
 
  Kirchner did not redefine Peronism, he simply represents one tendency of it,
110 a 
tendency until recently clearly in control (under Kirchner) of the—somewhat 
“verticalist”—Peronist movement. In the same way this left-wing tendency was 
completely marginalized in the 1990s, rightwing Peronism was then also temporarily 
relatively marginalized. The traditional Peronism “of the center,” as represented by 
Duhalde or before by metallurgic union official Lorenzo Miguel, always stands in a 
difficult balancing position: it is regarded as necessary when one of these right or left 
tendencies is building up power, and then shunned as that tendency attempts to 
consolidate itself in power (but never achieves it). Peronism is a dynamic movement, and 
its vitality lies precisely in the tension between tendencies, which are always seeking to 
become hegemonic but are regularly set back by the reversal of a given ideological 
model, electoral fortune, economic limitations, and the difficulties of re-reelections. 
  Finally, on the anti-Peronist side, important lessons and similarities emerge from 
the striking comparison between the 1990s (Figure 10) and the 2000s. In 2003, the ARI, 
on the left and of Radical origin, occupied the same space that the FREPASO occupied in 
the 1990s. They also then appealed to a similar electorate. The FG first sought to create a 
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order to include it. Having lost its potential low Peronist voters, the FREPASO, on the 
high and in a period of rapid growth, gradually moved toward the high center, on a direct 
collision course with the UCR, which had always occupied this space. After the 1995 
presidential election where they competed in part for the same voters, the FREPASO and 
the UCR came to the inevitable conclusion to form the Alianza. In the mid-2000s, ARI, 
under Carrió, also moved from left of center to the center (and some even argue the 
center-right), provoking in the process the desertion of several ARI leaders, and also 
increased its profile on the high, creating in 2007 the Coalición Cívica (Civic Coalition, 
or CC). The CC is difficult to pin down on the left-right axis, but stands very much on the 
high. With the rebirth of the Radical Civic Union (under Gerardo Morales), a Civic 
party,
111 which is as “civic” as the Civic Coalition, once again a spatial collision was 
inevitable. This has lead, once more, to the creation, this time not of an “Alianza” but of 
an Acuerdo Civico y Social (Social and Civic Agreement, or AcyS), in an almost 
fastidious repetition of history. In the meantime, and as always, the pendulum is again (in 
2009) threatening to swing, once more, between the left and the right and center of the 
Peronist movement. Is there a certain “compulsion to repeat,” out of a spatial and 
cleavage dynamic? 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has shown how Argentina’s political dynamic and political space is structured 
as a two-dimensional political space, and most particularly as a double political spectrum. 
In the process, it has also shown how the Peronism/anti-Peronism political cleavage has a 
meaning that extends beyond, and indeed crosscuts, programmatic or policy differences. 
While governing in Argentina is something that indeed occur along the left-right axis, 
whether one looks at the 1990s or the late 2000s, electoral appeals and elections in 
Argentina function to a large extent around the iron law of the high-low dimension, a 
reflection of Argentina’s society, history, political culture, and recurring problems—what 
one would call a cleavage. Argentina is a particularly telling case in that it demonstrates 
that social differences can be translated and politicized along a much different axis than 
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sociocultural and political-cultural differences remain quite relevant in politics—perhaps 
even more than when they are politicized along the left-right axis. 
  The paper also helps to explain Peronism itself. Peronism has long confounded 
political analysts because, while socially it is significantly class-based, it has stubbornly 
resisted political classification in left-right terms. Although it is by now clear that the 
movement contains both left and right wing elements, Peronism is still systematically 
different politically from the opposition it triggers. What has always distinguished 
Peronism from its opponents is the fact that it stands politically on the low, in terms of 
both dimensions of the high-low axis. It is for this reason that Peronism and anti-
Peronism have repeatedly leapfrogged each other on the left-right axis, without this 
fundamentally altering the party system. In many ways, moreover, Peronism creates anti-
Peronism—and historically, vice-versa as well. 
  A political repositioning toward the low on the part of the traditional non- or anti-
Peronist forces in Argentina to the extent required to transform such a structured political 
space remains very improbable for the time being. Such a repositioning would, moreover, 
be quite antithetical to what they think they stand for politically, in terms of their 
principles. Similarly, a transformation of the double political spectrum would require that 
Peronism and its leaders position themselves markedly on the high, in the process risking 
alienating their traditional electorate and losing the bonds that have kept alive loyalty, 
triggered passion, and fostered hope (thus risking losing “Peronism’s soul”).
112 A 
disastrous economic performance can be lethal to the institutional life of a political actor, 
but even in such instances one is much less likely to witness a reordering of the political 
space in Argentina than, as has already happened many times, the eventual birth of new 
institutional actors that move into the void left by the fallen one, thus keeping alive and 
feeding upon certain traditions, principles, attachments or, perhaps most importantly, 
sensitivities. 
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ENDNOTES 
 
1 See for example the first-rate empirical work of Canton, either alone (1973: 149–156; 1986) or 
with Jorrat (1978: 148–154; 1998: 149–156; 2007). 
2 I demonstrate this fact in my book manuscript through a logit regression based on survey data. 
Results display a remarkable significance level ( ), under .0005. 
3 While Di Tella emphasizes that “Peronist” parties are “populist workers’ parties” and not social 
democratic or labor parties, and more specifically that “Peronismo [is] a workers’ party…[that is] 
not social democratic” (1994: 262–63; see also, 1990: 149), in all of his writings from those of 
1965 through those of the 1980s and then the 1990s, and even in 2003, Peronism is  always 
characterized as on the verge of transforming itself into a labor or social-democratic party (1965: 
72,  74;  1984:  265;  1998:  216,  217,  219–20).  Peronism  is  also  characterized  as  the  local 
equivalent, in a less developed setting, of the Labor Party or as “occup[ying] a position akin to 
that of the Communists [in Italy]” (1990:155). In the 1960s, Di Tella forecasted the departure of 
the anti-status-quo elite minority from the populist movement and a greater reliance of the party 
on its trade union base. He described Peronism as, then, “developing a tendency to assume the 
shape of a labor movement...closer into line with European working-class tradition...This type 
gives way to a Labor version as found in fully industrialized societies” (1965: 72, 74). In the 
1990s, under neoliberal Menem, Di Tella foresaw that “a division of Peronism might take place... 
and a left-wing coalition might [thus] have…a Peronist faction appealing to ‘national popular’ 
traditions…[and] modern trade unionists [supporting] the statement that Peronism is a forerunner 
of social democracy” (1998: 219–20). Untiringly, Di Tella repeated the same forecast in 2002 
(“Una ruptura irreversible,” Clarín, 3 November 2002, p.16) and, again, in 2003 (presentation at 
the 39
th Colloquium of the Instituto para el desarrollo empresarial de la Argentina, Buenos Aires, 
6 November 2003).  
The structural and, to a certain extent, intuitive view of Peronism as left-of-center relies 
on its electoral source of support and mobilization, which clearly lies among the popular sectors, 
and on its clear organizational links with the unions. A very influential perspective in the US 
sharing some political and intellectual affinity to that of Di Tella is that of Collier and Collier 
(1991),  where  a  key  feature  of  Peronism  is  the  organizational  links  established  between  the 
populist party that incorporated labor and the unions. Their definition of populism also “draws 
heavily on the widely cited discussion of di Tella” (Collier and Collier 1991: 788). 
4 While Jose Luis Romero was unequivocal about what he clearly considered a fascist regime in 
1946, for Tulio Halperín, Perón undoubtedly attempted to establish a fascist regime but failed in 76   Ostiguy 
 
 
his enterprise. Closer to the events, back in 1956, Halperín wrote that Peronism was born “de una 
tentativa fascista” (of a fascist attempt) and that “fascism was the system of reference out of 
which Perón had formed his political ideology” before 1943, but that the founder of Peronism 
“elaborated what we could call...a fascism of the possible, finding the maximum dose of fascism 
that post-war Argentina was in a condition to withstand” (1995 [1956]: 53–54). The founder of 
the social sciences in Argentina, Gino Germani (e.g., 1978) also compared the mobilizational 
experience of Peronism not so much with social democracy, like the later Di Tella, but with the 
mobilizational  experience  of  Mussolini’s  fascism  (which  he  had  lived),  while  highlighting 
differences between the two. 
5 The term “fascism” has unfortunately become synonymous in the last decades with right-wing, 
authoritarian, militaristic, and repressive regimes or movements. An accurate understanding of 
fascism, historically and conceptually, is not compatible with the demobilizational, atomizing, 
foreignizing,  repressive,  and  often  neoliberal  political  regimes  of  Pinochet,  Videla,  or  the 
Uruguayan juntas, quite independently of the severe normative condemnation that both rightly 
deserve. 
6  Seymour  Martin  Lipset  also  wrote,  intriguingly  but  not  without  logic:  “If  Peronism  is 
considered a variant of fascism, then it is a fascism of the left because it is based on the social 
strata who would otherwise turn to socialism or Communism as an outlet for their [claims] and 
frustrations”  (1981:  176).  Following  this  train  of  thought,  he  therefore  considers  Peronism  a 
peculiar form of “left” extremism, or non-liberal left (127, 129). 
7 For example the mass-distributed Manual del Peronista (The Peronist Manual) clearly states: 
“Our  social  doctrine  is  the  social-christian  doctrine”  (Partido  Peronista  1948:  70  and  27). 
Moreover,  one  of  the  well-known  “Twenty  Truths  of  Peronism,”  or  core  statements  of  what 
Peronism  is  about,  is  that  “justicialism  is  a  new  life  philosophy:  simple,  practical,  popular, 
profoundly Christian and humanist.” The popular educative magazine, Mundo Peronista, also 
emphasized  the  tight  relationship  between  Christianity  and  the  Peronist  Doctrine  (Mundo 
Peronista 24 [1952]). 
In brief, all official documents circulated by Perón and his party among the Peronist base 
for  mass  indoctrination  stressed  the  social-Christian  or  Christian  nature  of  Peronism’s  social 
doctrine. They also stressed that Peronism was a “third position” between the evils of liberal 
individualism and those of collectivism. 
8 As recently as 1998, T. Di Tella wrote in a newspaper column: “The strange thing is that the 
Peronists think they are Christian-Democrats, and indeed they have joined this international. And     Ostiguy   77
 
 
the Radicals think they are Social-Democrats, and they have also joined the respective world 
organization. But what people think has little to do with what they are.” (Translation by the 
author, Clarín, 18 October 1998). 
9 Personal communication by T. Halperín, 1995. The influential commentator Mariano Grondona 
also used the same political characterization to describe Menem’s Peronism, which he compared 
to that of the conservative caudillos of the 1940s in the Province of Buenos Aires (La Nación, 28 
September  1997).  Subsequently,  the  popular  magazine  Noticias  also  adopted  the  term  for 
Menem’s Peronism (e.g., 28 July 2001). 
10 There are many instances of Perón’s praise of Che Guevara. In Carta de Perón al movimiento 
peronista  con  motivo  de  la  muerte  del  ‘Che’  Guevara  (Letter  from  Perón  to  the  Peronist 
movement about Che Guevara’s death), for example, Perón writes: “His death tears my soul apart 
because he was one of ours, perhaps the best....I have read some wires that pretend to present him 
as an enemy of Peronism. Nothing more absurd.... [His death is] an irreparable loss for the cause 
of people who fight for their liberation. Peronism, as a national, popular, revolutionary movement 
pays  an  emotional  homage  to  the  idealist,  the  revolutionary,  the  Comandante  Ernesto  ‘Che’ 
Guevara,  the  Argentine  guerilla  fighter  who  died  in  action  taking  up  arms  in  pursuit  of  the 
triumph of national revolutions in Latin America” (translation by the author, Baschetti 1988: 
273–74). 
11 In Spanish: “Este Chinito quien me roba las ideas.” More formally, Perón expressed a deep 
political affinity with Mao’s project, in one of his most famous books, writing: “The bold attitude 
of the Great Mao has divided with clarity national socialism from the international socialism that 
gave rise to Soviet imperialism. ...For us, those of the third position, ...the refusal of Mao to side 
with colonialism...lays the foundation of the ‘Third World’ in which the different socialist 
democracies can get along perfectly...There is no reason for nationalism and socialism to quarrel. 
Both ...can unite with the common objective of liberating the pueblos [(the various people)]” 
(Perón, in La Hora de los Pueblos 1987 [1968]: 142–43). 
12 Many analysts of Argentine politics, such as Cheresky (2007) and Cheresky and Pousadela 
(2004) for example, have quite plausibly argued that the Argentine party system has imploded 
since 2001. Whether accurate or not (and certainly, many new parties and actors have emerged, 
while others have vanished or dramatically shrunk), the argument does not invalidate in any way 
our characterization about the spatial location and political affinities (and antagonism) of political 
forces or actors in Argentina. In fact, it remarkably strengthens it. 
13 See for example Ostiguy (1990: 324–332, incl. f.n. 26). 78   Ostiguy 
 
 
14  One  of  the  few  key  public  figures  who  has  remained  consistent  on  that  left-right  axis  is 
Domingo Cavallo, on the right, who has sequentially served in key economic positions under the 
military, the Peronists, and the Alianza led by a Radical president. 
15 One should make clear that the low in politics is not limited to Peronism, although it is by far 
its main component. In the 1990s, for example, the MODIN of Aldo Rico was clearly on the low. 
It did oppose the economic model of Carlos Menem, but an alliance with the FREPASO would 
have been unthinkable. Not surprisingly, it eventually joined the Peronism of Duhalde, also on 
the low center. 
16 On the concept and definition of cleavage, see the now classic work of Bartolini and Mair 
(1990). 
17 The very first rough draft of this long paper was written in 2000.  
18 This short section inevitably borrows from Ostiguy (2009). These two Kellogg working papers 
should normally be read together, as they form a series.  
19 One could also say "well-mannered" or "well-bred," regarding demeanor, in the sense of "bien 
educado" in Spanish or "bien élevé" in French. 
20 It is important to emphasize that these are claims, repeatedly made in the political arena, rather 
than observations of actual behavior along those lines. They are, in other words, types of appeals 
and ways of presenting oneself to the public. Of course, to be credible it helps that there be a 
relation between those claims and actual practices, or that there be at least no overt contradiction. 
21 Perceptions of immediacy have important implications with respect to establishing relations 
with “regular” people (la gente) or “the people” (el pueblo). Personalism can also be seen as 
warmer and easier to relate to.  
22 Svampa (1994) offers a review of the vicissitudes of this topic through Argentine political and 
intellectual history. See also Shumway (1991) on the nineteenth century. 
23 See also De la Fuente (2000) for a historically well-researched book on that topic, especially 
page 78 and 86–89. In a previous work (Ostiguy 2007: 93–94), in the section “The ‘Dreaded 
Alliance’: The Montoneras,” I describe the montoneras as hordes of Federal horsemen, made up 
of unkempt, rough, unruly, and generally lower-class gauchos with lances, fighting under the 
leadership of a caudillo in an uneven battle against the centralizing Unitarios. 
24 See Sarmiento’s well-known book, Facundo: Civilización y barbarie, translated into English in 
the  nineteenth  century  as  Life  in  the  Argentine  Republic  in  the  Days  of  the  Tyrants;  or, 
Civilization and Barbarism (1974 [1868]), chapters 1 and 2.     Ostiguy   79
 
 
25 Perón was preceded in that role, in the script of the oligarchic elite, by Hipólito Yrigoyen, the 
leader of the Radicales in the first third of the century. The animosity towards Yrigoyen and the 
explicit comparison with Rosas, however, was never as strong. Peron’s rule, indeed, was the 
“second,” and not the “third,” tyranny. See Svampa (1994) and Ostiguy (1998). 
26 See Ostiguy (2007: 105), however, for the chain of equivalence that was created at the cultural-
symbolic level. 
27  The  purpose  of  the  present  paper  is  not  to  develop  a  methodology  designed  to  measure 
positions on the high-low scale with quantitative precision. Such a task is both desirable and 
feasible, being equivalent in objectives to the methods developed for measuring programmatic 
positions on the left-right scale (e.g., Budge, Robertson, and Hearl 1987 or Heath, Evans, and 
Martin 1994). It is, however, appropriately the object of a separate article. 
28 During the first Perón government, Borges wrote a short story in slang, entitled "The Feast of 
the Monster” (1994 [1947]) which depicted an uncultured, lower-sector bus driver on his way to 
the Peronist founding event of October 17. Later, in "L’illusion comique," a well known piece 
published in the highbrow literary magazine Sur (1955), he described the Perón period as “years 
of opprobrium and foolery...made up of stupidity or gross ignorance and of fairy-tales for the 
consumption of boors and bumpkins." 
29 The point here is not that Peronist leaders are just like the Federal caudillos of the nineteenth 
century.  Rather,  Peronist  leaders  and  their  followers  often  refer  to  caudillismo  as  a  form  of 
legitimation  and  as  a  model  (with  clear  roots  in  Argentina)  for  a  particular  type  of  political 
practice and representation. 
30  A  well-known  case  of  patoterismo  in  the  1990s  was  that  of  "Batata”  ("Sweet  Potato"—a 
nickname he picked up while working at the central market carrying cases of yams), who was 
involved in beating up a journalist for researching "what he was not supposed to research.” 
31 Quoted in Cerruti (1993:155). 
32 The Carapintadas, or literally “Painted Faces,” were a radical right-wing nationalist military 
group within the Argentine Armed Forces during the 1980s, mainly known for staging three 
military uprisings against the democratically elected Alfonsín Radical government, particularly in 
opposition to the human rights trials then going on. They claimed to want to preserve the dignity 
of the Armed Forces. Their ideology was nationalist and on the Catholic far-right. Particularly 
“virile,” they claimed to be into combat and heroism. The best book on the topic is arguably 
Norden (1996). 80   Ostiguy 
 
 
33 It is important to highlight that in Argentina, the pejorative term “los negros” does not refer to 
people of African origins, with black skin, but to poorer and generally less educated people with 
somewhat darker skin and black hair, usually partly mestizo. It is not clear, furthermore, if the 
category is a racial one (i.e., someone not entirely white) or, as I would perhaps be more inclined 
to think, a social one. Both elements are present. 
34 In the mid 1990s, the MODIN was absorbed, however (and not too surprisingly) by the 
Peronism of Duhalde. On the Iron Guard and the Commando of Organization, see endnote 46 
below. 
35 On the “inordinate fear of communism” on the part of a certain—nationalist—fraction of the 
elite in Argentina at the time, see Waisman (1987: chapters 6 and 7). 
36 On that topic, from a perspective highly sympathetic to popular culture, see the excellent work 
of James (1988, 1995). 
37 Perón’s internal opponents within the military, responding to the pressure from the growing 
opposition movement, sought an immediate return to civilian, liberal democratic rule, without any 
military continuity. 
38 Speech by Perón on the night of 17 October 1945, reproduced in Britos (1984: 192–194) and in 
many other sources.  
39 The two subdimensions of left and right, analyzed in details in Ostiguy (2009: 11–16), here 
become extremely relevant. In terms of economics and distribution, Perón could absolutely not, 
as the ordinary working class well understood, be considered on the right. He thus shared a 
position with the leftist political parties, in the opposite camp. The other dimension of left and 
right, about authority-and-order in public decision-making, remained present, but had somewhat 
faded in the two years from 1943 to 1945. 
40 See, for example, the national newspaper La Razón, 7 November 1945, p. 8.  
41  Doctor  G.  Topolevsky  and  Frugoni  Zabala,  national  delegates  for  the  UCR,  quoted  in  La 
Razón, 5 November 1945. 
42 The many cartoons published during that precise period in La Hora and in La Vanguardia are 
particularly vivid and extreme in that regard. 
43In his first electoral rally, Perón declared: “we will not call anybody rabble or shirtless...We will 
have a good solid heart under a shirt, which is better than having a bad heart under a coat.” 
Nonetheless, during the applause after Perón’s speech, someone handed him a flagpole with a 
shirt tied to it as a flag. Perón was then photographed waving it, an image circulated nationally by     Ostiguy   81
 
 
the  opposition  press.  From  then  on,  the  shirt(less)  would  be  a  Peronist  symbol.
  (Speech 
reproduced in Luna (1969: 432).) 
44  The  theoretical  relation  between  the  two  parts  of  Figure  2  could,  a  priori,  logically  be 
understood in an “uncommitted,” tri-dimensional way: the bottom part of Figure 2 would thus be 
pictured as a third dimension, of depth, in relation to the (already two-dimensional) top part of 
Figure 2. Thus, here, all combinations between the two parts of the figure would be logically 
possible a priori. However, in a much more ambitious way and as done in this section, we believe 
(as elaborated and justified elsewhere) that the two parts of Figure 2 can be superimposed in a 
graphically simple (and “flat”) two-dimensional way, creating a figure the shape of a wheel. We 
are thus making here an empirical and specifically theoretical statement about the ordering of the 
divides in relation to one another. In this way, the poles of all subdimensions are thus not entirely 
neutral with regard to each other—even though high-low and left-right, as a whole, are.  
45 The military coup that overthrew the Perón government and thus marked the end of the ten-
year old Peronist regime called itself the “Libertadora,” or “liberating revolution.” The name is a 
very partial denomination that nonetheless reflected the spirit and interpretation of the anti-
Peronist side of the divide, for whom Peronism had been a period of marked authoritarian rule, 
associated by some to fascism. The name has stayed with us to the present. 
46  I  qualify  these  governments  as  semi-democratic  because  of  the  official  electoral  ban  on 
Peronism. 
47 In the paintings of Carpani, for example, workers with massive bodies and unkempt gauchos 
charging on horses with lances gave an emancipatory bodily character to “barbarism.” 
48 The ERP even renamed a sugar plantation they occupied in the interior "Ho Chi Minh." 
49Gorila is a Peronist term used to describe virulent anti-Peronists. Coined in the aftermath of the 
1955 coup against Perón, the term has come to refer to anyone who feels aversion, or at least 
dislike, for the masses and especially the lower sectors.  
50 “La juventud peronista sale a la calle y pelea y si se encuentra un gorila si no lo caga lo mea.” 
Personal collection of Peronist cantos, most of which (including this one) were taken from the 
Peronist historical archive of archivist Roberto Baschetti, at the Biblioteca Nacional. 
51 For example, as McGuire (1997: 98) writes, Augusto Vandor “organized gangs of street toughs 
who stifled dissent in exchange for a meal, a few drinks, and a night of camaraderie.”  
52 While the location of Brito Lima’s Comando de Organización far on the Peronist right is 
unproblematic and part of a consensus, many militants of the Guardia de Hierro (Iron Guard) 
would clearly take issue to be located on the right. They viewed themselves as a militarized, ultra-82   Ostiguy 
 
 
orthodox Peronist organization, against any type of challenges within Peronism to the authority of 
the leader, Perón. In the 1970s, such challenges within Peronism came from the Peronist left, thus 
the strong left-“right” antagonism between the Montoneros and Guardia de Hierro. In the 1960s, 
however, Guardia de Hierro, opposed Vandor and supported Rucci for the same reason, that is, 
the undisputed leadership of the leader, and here the issue was not a left-right one. I somewhat 
controversially locate Guardia de Hierro on the Peronist right in that its motivation is absolute 
allegiance to the national leader and not working-class union claims or “liberation or 
dependency” or “the pueblo peronista.” (See, for example, Pozzi and Cerviño, n.d.) Labels here 
are confusing: while the Rumanian Iron Guard was clearly proto-fascist, it is actually the 
Comando de Organizacion (and not the Argentine Iron Guard) that is very strongly and explicitly 
anti-Semitic. The Comando de Orgazación was also close to Lopez Rega and the Argentine Anti-
Communist Alliance. 
53Quebracho is a native species of hardwood that grows in the northern hinterland of Argentina. 
54 The orthodox then won the confrontation, forcing the ousting of López Rega. The orthodox, on 
the very-low center-right, then confronted Italo Luder, also on the center but much more on the 
high within Peronism, in the last months before the coup, with the former opposing any form of 
party  institutionalization  (McGuire  1997:168–69).  McGuire  makes  it  clear  that  “the  cleavage 
between verticalists [Miguel, “the parrot”] and antiverticalists [Luder; Victorio Calabro] did not 
correspond directly to a rivalry between unionists and politicians” (ibid). 
55 This situation stands in sharp contrast to that of Brazil, for example. This shows how deeply 
rooted in society and history are the political divisions of Argentina. Party institutionalization, of 
course,  is  a  different  matter.  The  observation  made  here  is  about  the  durability  of  the  given 
structure of a political space, as well as, secondarily, the continuity over time of major political 
parties, movements, or set of parties (such as the socialist parties in Argentina). On the concept of 
party institutionalization in Latin America, see Levitsky (1998a, 2001a, 2003). 
56 This style was so pronounced that Alfonsín gave him the nickname of el llorón, or “cry baby.”  
57 The UCR had often been characterized as a party of “committees,” with a set of notables, rather 
than a mobilizing and bureaucratized mass party. The Coordinadora aimed to transform the UCR 
into a mass-mobilizing party. 
58 In that sense, in order to perform well in the political arena, Alfonsín decided to make the UCR 
more similar, in these respects, to Peronism. This strategy paid off politically during most of the 
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59.Adelina de Viola, in contrast to other UCeDe leaders, maintained a lower-middle-class cultural 
demeanor. Significantly, de Viola defected to the PJ in 1994. 
60. See also on that topic Norden (1996: 136–39; 213). Apparently, the Carapintadas also had ties 
to low-right Peronists such as some ex-Iron Guard members. Aldo Rico, after forming his own, 
independent political party, eventually joined with Peronism in the mid-1990s. 
61  In  the  Province  of  Buenos  Aires  in  1985,  the  UCR  won  41.5%  of  the  vote,  the  Frente 
Renovador 27%, and the FREJULI, 9.7% (Ministerio del Interior). 
62 Menem’s behavior is thus much more in line with the directional theory of voting than with the 
proximity model. On that topic, see the numerous articles of George Rabinowitz. 
63 I wish to express my thanks to Steve Levitsky for the numerous feedback and intellectual 
exchanges that gave birth to this section, as well as for the more general editing work from which 
sections of this paper benefited. 
64In-depth interviews carried out among low-income residents of Greater Buenos Aires found that 
the primary reason given for supporting the Menem government was not its economic policies, 
but the fact that it was Peronist (Ostiguy 1998: chapter 6).  
65 For Teichman, a policy network in Latin America is an economic-policy, technocratic clique, 
tightly integrated and bound by personal relations, that is located inside the coalition in power but 
that  is  often  at  odds  with  the  interests  of  the  coalition  partners.  Such  policy  networks  have 
ramifications downward within the state and civil society and upward within international lending 
agencies  (2001:16–22).  At  a  more  general  level,  Weyland  (1996)  made  the  argument  that 
populism  in  the  post–mass-party  organization  phase  is  highly  compatible  with  neoliberalism. 
Roberts, a year earlier (1995), made a similar argument, although focusing more on targeted 
clientelism (which he still sees as being against a pure free market logic). 
66 This latter case assumes that a whole group of voters, defined sociologically, respond to only 
one  type  of  appeals.  As  I  argue  in  this  paper,  however,  voters  politically  on  the  high-right 
(especially within the upper-middle class) and on the low-left (particularly within the popular 
sectors) had to “decide,” or respond, between conflicting sets of appeals. 
67 In Argentina, vast sectors of the population have been at different times between 1955 and 
1983 without access to any machine politics, and not under the umbrella of a union, but Peronism 
remained very much alive as a political identity. 
68 EPH (Encuesta Permanente de Hogares), of the Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censo, 
Ministerio  de  Economía,  República  Argentina,  or  National  Institute  of  Statistics  and  Census, 
Ministry of the Economy, Republic of Argentina. 84   Ostiguy 
 
 
69In my interviews, 55% of the lower-sector Peronist sympathizers rejected the new economic 
orientation; 25% said it was necessary, but did not like it; and 20% agreed with it (1998: 466).  
  In  November  1989,  Domingo  Cavallo  was  evaluated  as  “good”  by  63%  of  the  high 
socioeconomic level, but by only 30% in the low socioeconomic level (Equas 23). In March 
1990, at a difficult moment, the percentage of respondents giving a “good/very good” evaluation 
of the economic policy was more than twice as high in the high socioeconomic level as it was in 
the low; inversely, 72% of the low socioeconomic level evaluated the economic policy as bad, 
compared to 50% in the high socioeconomic level (Equas 26). In August 1991, the economic plan 
was far more popular among the high socioeconomic level than Menem was, while the reverse 
held true in the low socioeconomic level. The high socioeconomic level then gave a 75% rate of 
approval  to  the  economic  plan,  but  only  a  44%  approval  rating  to  Menem  (Equas  43).  The 
approval rating for the economic plan was 24 points lower among the low socioeconomic level. 
  The social differences in attitudes toward privatization are consistent with this picture. 
The  middle  and  the  high  socioeconomic  levels  gave  an  approval  rating  of  70%  and  68%, 
respectively, to privatization; only 26% and 29%, respectively, disagreed with them. Among the 
lower socioeconomic level, opinions were about equally divided (Equas 26). (See next note for 
description of Equas.)  
70 All surveys are from the survey firm Equas, which the survey firm Sofres-Ibope in Argentina 
inherited. Each survey was numbered and archived under such a number by Equas. The very 
numerous cross-tabulations sheets derived from each those surveys and printed for the customers 
who ordered the survey are available from the author.  
71See preceding note. 
72 See note above, as well as Ostiguy (1998) on voting patterns. My substantive conclusions on 
political behavior are thus very different, to say the least, from those reached by Stokes (2001). 
The issue can only be resolved by comparing empirical survey data that is socially differentiated. 
My conclusions, based on the wide collection of Sofres-Ibope surveys in my possession, are also 
very much in line with my own field experience on the ground and with my interviews in the 
lower-sector areas of the Greater Buenos Aires, a stronghold of Peronism. 
73 Canton and Jorrat, leading experts in quantitative political sociology of voting behavior, have 
also highlighted in their work the key, determining importance of partisan identity in Peronist 
voting behavior, including during the 1990s (Canton and Jorrat 2002: 420, 424). In Ostiguy 
(1998), I empirically studied the phenomenon both qualitatively (through interviews) and 
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74 A notable exception is Dominguez and McCann (1995) on attitudes on policy issues in Mexico 
(where political identities are moreover weaker, emotionally, than in Argentina). 
75 Our own research (Ostiguy 1998) and that of Canton and Jorrat (2002) strongly support that 
claim. 
76 A good parallel, admittedly much more emotionally charged than that of political identity in 
Argentina but sharing a similar dynamic logic, is that of soccer club membership and identity, for 
which people even kill or get killed in that country. The logic of identity has an important social 
and individual function. 
77 Peronism, after all, is largely about the success of “one of ours” to the shiny and glamorous 
attributes of power, without renouncing the link with the pueblo. Evita also conspicuously 
displayed jewelry and furs, without renouncing, on the contrary, the affective link with the 
descamisados. A similar phenomenon also occurs with pop singers or professional sport idols, 
whether in boxing (Gatica) or soccer (Maradona). 
78 For example, when announcing in a Greater Buenos Aires shantytown that he was going to 
make English compulsory in primary schools, Menem added, in a marked crescendo: “...and this 
way, we will be able to tell the Brits, in their own language, that the Malvinas are Argentine!” 
79 See also Nun (1995) for a similar analysis, contemporary to the initial drafts of this research. 
80 MODIN peaked at 9 percent of the national vote (13 percent in the province of Buenos Aires) 
in  1994.  This  electoral  support  was  concentrated  among  the  poor,  and  MODIN  consistently 
performed best in Peronist strongholds such as the second belt of Greater Buenos Aires. 
81  Though  of  minor  electoral  significance,  the  support  of  the  wealthy  sectors  was  critical  to 
Menem’s ability to attract international investment and remain securely in power. 
82 Canton and Jorrat (2002: 422) find a similar, but more pronounced pattern. As they state: “[For 
the first time, class did] not emerge as a crucial factor vis-à-vis political identification in 
1995…One possible explanation is that the middle and upper-middle classes adhered to the new 
economic policies heralded by the Peronist candidate, combining the traditional working-class 
constituency of Peronist electorate with the higher strata. This ultimately might have produced the 
statistical insignificance of the class variable.” However, in 1999, the “upper-middle class sectors 
who had voted for Peronism in 1995 moved either to the Alianza or to a third party, headed by 
former Minister of Economics, Domingo Cavallo” (ibid: 423). 
83  Within  the  most  endowed  sectors  of  society,  there  is  a  striking  difference  in  political 
preferences between those with the highest educational level, who tended to be on the high (and 86   Ostiguy 
 
 
often  on  the  high-left  in  fact)  and  to  clearly  oppose  Menemism,  and  those  with  the  highest 
economic level, who tended to be on the high-right and often favored Menemism. 
84 While the reaction within the Peronist popular sectors to the new neoliberal orientation aroused 
a lot of academic interest, the even higher level of concern, irritation, and unhappiness within 
those same Peronist popular sectors for the new unconditional alignment of the PJ government on 
the  United  States  (characterized  by  the  PJ  leadership  in  a  characteristically  low  fashion  as  a 
relación carnal (carnal relationship) has gone largely unnoticed and unstudied. 
85  Many  people  on  the  high-right  opposed  Menem,  such  as  Mario  Grondona  for  example, 
certainly not from the left, but as high. That is, their belief in the high trumped their economically 
right-wing convictions. For Bernardo Neustadt, it was just the reverse. 
86 Cavallo has an image that is less conspicuously high than that of the Alsogaray family, which 
one associates more readily with the wealthy neighborhood of Barrio Norte. Evolving with his 
time, Cavallo has attempted to present a more modernist, technological, pro-enterprise, US-like 
image, although he remains popular generally in the same social sectors as the previous UCeDe. 
  Cavallo, as always more right than high, also formed a temporary alliance with the sector 
most to the right and to the high of Peronism in Capital, led by Gustavo Beliz. 
87 For an analysis of the constitutional reform, see Cheresky (1999: 273–311). 
88 Novaro and Palermo (1998: 132) present a similar, although not identical, argument. 
89 Álvarez had the support of the political organizations constituting most of the FREPASO, 
including the FG, the newly incorporated US, as well as the unions sympathetic to the 
FREPASO. Novaro and Palermo make the same point (1998:144). 
90 Página/12, 3 April 1994, pp. 3–4. 
91 The economically right-wing turn of Menem, together with his new social alliances, certainly 
created severe tensions for Ubaldini. Ubaldini even ran on a separate Peronist ballot in 1991, but 
received few votes. In contrast to much higher unions such as the Asociación Trabajadores del 
Estado (State Workers’ Association, or ATE) (white-collar state employees) and the 
Confederación de Trabajadores de la Educación de la República Argentina (Confederation of 
Education Workers of Argentina, or CTERA) (teachers), Ubaldini could not break with Peronism, 
the “movement of the Argentine pueblo.” As with other left Peronists, he would have to oppose 
(without success) from within. 
92 What used to be called the “Capital Federal” and is now called the Autonomous City of Buenos 
Aires is the equivalent of the DF in Mexico or of DC in the US. It is a “state” that is not a state, 
the core of a city that is almost a state, or to be more precise a city which has been “federalized,”     Ostiguy   87
 
 
as the nation’s capital. Up to 1996, the executive power of Federal Capital was a civil servant 
appointed by the president (and ratified by the Senate), with the name (itself originating in the 
colonial period) of intendant. Since the executive head is now elected, he or she is called chief of 
government. 
93 It is not possible to repeatedly cross the main cleavage of Argentine politics with impunity. 
After leaving the FREPASO, Bordón tried to come back to the PJ; his political career, however, 
was by then over.  
94 Declaration made on 31 March 1998, quoted in Microsemanario 312. 
95 ”Porteno” refers to residents of the Federal Capital, which is a port city. 
96 As governor, Duhalde visited poor neighborhoods on an almost daily basis, eating choripanes 
(local chorizo “hotdogs”), sharing maté, and playing cards with people. He also insisted on being 
called “negro.” (Interview with Alberto Perez, a former PJ leader in Buenos Aires, by Steven 
Levitsky, October 1996). 
97 This last section borrows heavily from Ostiguy (2005), in French, translated into English in the 
March 2006 LASA paper “Peronist and non-Peronist Lefts: The Argentine Party System in the 
Kirchner Era.” 
98 Ramón Puerta (21–23 December 2001), Adolfo Rodriguez Saá (23 December–1 January 2002), 
and Eduardo Camaño (1–2 January 2002). All told, Argentina saw five presidents in two weeks, 
if Fernando De la Rúa and Eduardo Duhalde are included. 
99 The punteros are the agents of political clientelism who distribute goods of primary necessity in 
exchange for political and social support; they work in the underprivileged communities and are 
associated with Peronism. According to S. Levitsky, “[the punteros] use personal ties, persuasion, 
and material favors to construct a clientele, which permits them to act as the guardians of their 
area’s votes. They then take these votes to the negotiating table with the local politicians, who 
offer them jobs and other state resources in return for their support” (Levitsky 2003:67; see also 
Auyero 2000). On a political analysis of clientelism in Argentina, see the masterful articles of 
Calvo and Murillo (2004, 2005). 
100 Regarding the fortuitousness of Kirchner coming to power, Cheresky (2004b: 27–36 ) makes a 
similar argument, well documented with survey data and contextual historical analysis.  
101 Cheresky certainly strongly makes this point. While he has repeatedly stated it, the most 
explicit formulation is in Cheresky (2006a: 13–23), in the edited volume tellingly titled La 
política después de los partidos (Politics after Political Parties).  88   Ostiguy 
 
 
  On party system fragmentation and party system polarization see, for example, 
Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñan (2005: 24–25). 
102 Since Carlos Menem was at that time president of the National Council (i.e., the executive) of 
the Justicialist Party (PJ), and held at his disposal a real possibility to manipulate the electoral 
register of the PJ to his own advantage in a primary, President Duhalde, who enjoyed majority 
support in Peronist circles, convened a national congress of the Justicialist Party and obtained 
from  the  delegates  a  majority  vote  to  cancel  the  primary  and  permit  the  three  principal 
preliminary candidates for president to participate directly and separately in the general election. 
With  Peronism’s  dominance  at  the  national  level  assured  by  a  long  shot,  the  PJ’s  primaries 
became in a sense open and national. The goal of the original maneuver was to avoid Menem 
becoming the official Peronist candidate, which would have guaranteed him the presidency. 
103 For a comparative perspective on party systems in Latin America, see the major edited volume 
by Mainwaring and Scully (1995).  
104 The radical president De la Rúa was at the immediate source of the 2001 crisis, which majorly 
affected the popularity of his party. Nevertheless, both non-Peronist presidential candidates were 
of a Radical origin, since Elisea Carrió, the leader of ARI (Argentinos por una República de 
Iguales), was a longtime Radical deputy before founding ARI, and Ricardo López Murphy was a 
militant with the Radical Youth as well as a cabinet member and finance minister under the 
Radical presidency of De la Rúa. 
105 This thesis, running counter to the institutionalism prevalent in American political science 
today,  is  very  close  to  René  Rémond’s  classic  work  on  the  rights  in  France,  where  political 
“currents” or “tendencies” are much more stable than parties. These currents can certainly be 
situated spatially, as Rémond does with them on the left-right spectrum. The specific character of 
the Argentine party system lies not so much in the “precedence” (or “anteriority”) of the current 
or spatial position over party organization, as in its two-dimensionality. 
106 Gorila (gorilla) is the pejorative expression used by Peronists to designate those who hold 
fierce anti-Peronist sentiments and are perceived as scornful of the “unclean,” “ignorant,” and 
“noisy” classes. 
107 The presidential elections of April 2003 were the first following the “get rid of them all!”: the 
politicians overtly sought to demonstrate “that they were not all alike.” 
108 During the campaign, Carrió and Rodríguez Saá lost the most ground (partly to Kirchner), 
whereas  López  Murphy  gained  the  most.  The  final  results  of  the  first  round  of  presidential     Ostiguy   89
 
 
elections  on  April  27,  2003  were:  Menem,  24.5%;  Kirchner,  22.2%;  López  Murphy,  16.4%; 
Rodríguez Saá, 14.1%; Carrió, 14.1%  
109 For an excellent analysis of the 2005 legislative elections, see Cheresky (2006b: 53–63). For 
that time period, see also Levitsky and Murillo (2008). 
110 Each tendency has its own interpretation of Peronism, which it considers most legitimate. 
Though  ideologically  very  far  from  one  another,  these  tendencies—like  most  things  in 
Peronism—are informal. Their fortune depends on the power acquired by certain leaders when 
they delimit their own ideological projects. 
  Seen from another angle, the tendencies are not ideological projects (on the left-right 
axis) capable of existing independently of the party in question, but rather diverse interpretations 
of what constitutes “real” Peronism. Paradoxically, this situation leads to a reduced tolerance for 
the inevitable, stubborn “interpretive adversaries,” who are not perceived as a legitimate minority 
but  instead  as  “mistaken.”  A  better  parallel  would  seem  to  be  that  of  divergent  Christian 
interpretations (“tendencies”) in relation to a mortal pope.  
111 Not surprisingly, considering our very definition of the “high,” such a family of parties have 
chosen as the key, characterizing epithet for their political formation the label of “civic.” This 
pole of the divide is quite in line with how this political divide should be comparatively 
understood--even if such dichotomy or polarity is rarely used, if it all, in the political science 
literature on the topic. Obviously, such self-characterization is normatively highly positive, so the 
literature then needs to use an equally positive label for the other pole, in order to be acceptable. 
For that reason, we prefer “high” and “low”, as defined and described above. 
112 Argentines refer to this “feeling,” to this “soul of Peronism,” as the mística peronista, or 
Peronist mystic.  
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